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1The 1857 Introduction to the Grundrisse is one of the most pivotal 
of Marx's texts. It is also one of his most difficult, compressed and 
'illegible' texts. In his excellent Foreword to the Pelican edition 
of the Grundrisse.>Nicolaus warns that, by its very nature, Marx's 
Notebooks are hazardous to quote, "since the context, the grammar and the 
very vocabulary raise doubts as to what Marx 'really' meant in a given 
passage" (P25). Vilar observes that the 1857 Introduction is one of 
those texts "from which everyone takes whatever suits him" (NLR 80).
I hope to have avoided the second of these traps, and I have certainly 
experienced the hazard of the first. However, the Intro remains - 
indeed, with the growing interest in Marx's method and epistemology, 
occupies an increasingly central position - in the study of Marx's work.
I share this sense of its significance, while differing often from, 
how many of Marx's explicators have read its meaning. My aim, then, 
is to inaugurate a 'reading' of the 1857 text: a reading which, because 
of the difficulties Nicolaus has drawn to our attention must necessarily 
take the form of an 'explication', laborious though that form is. It 
is, of course, not a reading tabula rasa, not a reading 'without 
presuppositions': thus, a 'reading' which, in Althusser's sense, is a 
'guilty' one. It reflects my own problematic, inevitably. I hope.it 
also throws some undistorted light on Marx's.
In a Letter of Jan 1*t, 1858, Marx wrote to Engels: "I am getting 
some nice developments. For instance, I have thrown over the whole 
doctrine of profit as it has existed up to now. In the method of treat­
ment the fact that, by mere accident, I have glanced through Hegel's 
Logic has been of great service to me - Freiligarth found some volumes 
of Hegel which originally belonged to Bakunin and sent them to me as a 
present. If there should ever be time for such work again, I should 
greatly like to make accessible to the ordinary human intelligence 
in two or three printer's sheets, what is rational in the method which 
Hegel discovered but at the same time enveloped in mysticism.."
It was not the only time Marx made expressed .that- hope. The Critique 
of Hegel's Philosophy As A Whole, usually printed together with the
, , « . i . .V » ,
other l8Wf Manuscripts, also aimed at an exposition and critique of 
Hegel’s dialectic in relation to both'the PhenomenQlogyv.andl.the Logic, 
but was, in the final event, largely confined to the-former. As late 
as 1876, he wrote to Dietzgen, "When I have shaken off the burden of 
my economic labours, I shall write a dialectic. The correct laws of 
the dialectic are already included in Hegel, albeit in a mystical form.
It is necessary to 6trip it of this form”. (Samtliche Schriften, vol 1. 
1922. Translated in Hook, From Hegel to Marx). (Incidentally, the 
references to Hegel and the Dialectic are far niore; frequent, in letters 
and asides in Marx's mature work than recent commentators would have us 
believe: and they almost invariably take the form of noting the 'rational' 
kernal within the 'mystical shell',and the need to take, by transformation, 
what was valid in Hqgel while abandoning its mystical form. Marx may 
" have been mistaken in thinking that he could'work with-and-against Hegel 
in this way: but the attempts, by Althusser and others, to represent this 
as a casual metaphor which 'Marx did not really mean.' is extraiely- difficult 
to substantiate from the evidence. Cf My fuller discussion of this in the 
"Settling'Accounts With Althusser" paper).
The hopes were not to be fulfilled, the burden of the economics never 
laid aside. Thus, we do not have, from the mature Marx, either the 
systematic delineation of the 'rational kernal', nor the method of its 
" transformation, nor an exposition of the results of that transformation: 
the Marxian dialectic. Not even a systematic, account of how the latter 
would differ from the former. The 1857 Introduction, and the- fgr..5ipre 
compressed 1859 Preface to the Critique, together with‘other scattered 
asides, have therefore to do duty for the unfulfilled parts of Marx's 
project', and the 1857 Intro in particular as representing his fullest 
methodological and theoretical summary-text.' Decisive,-however, as this
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text is, we must not handle it as if it were something other than it is.
It was written as an Introduction to the Notebooks on "The Economic 
Categories" which now comprise the Grundrisse. These Notebooks are, 
themselves, enormously comprehensive in scope, digressive and complex 
in structure: and quite unfinished - "rough drafts". The fact that 
a methodological Introduction was drafted for what were essentially 
working notebooks is not at all surprising, for, as well as their 
rich theoretical content, the Grundrisse is noteworthy for allowing 
us "so direct an inquiry into...his method of working" (Nicolaus, P25). 
Rosdolsky remarked that it "introduces us, so to speak, into Marx's 
economic laboratory and lays bare all the refinements, all the bypaths 
of his methodology". The Introduction was thus conceived as an abstract, 
a resume and guide, to the 'problems of method' concretely and more 
expansively applied in the analysis of the Notebooks themselves: material 
which, then, by revision, expansion and compression, modification and 
further labour, was transformed, first, into the Critique, and then into 
the successive versions of Capital. It was not, therefore, intended 
to stand wholly in its own right. The examples it treats 'on the run* 
are often drawn from, and can be found in a much developed form,.in the 
Notebooks themselves. Indeed, one of the most illuminating uses of the 
Intro is to turn from the brief methodological resumes, to the substantive 
passages to which they refer, and to see how the method informs the actual 
working-through of a particular point in the demonstration. But it remains 
what it says - an 'Introduction'. Moreover, the tentative character of 
the text was signified by Marx's decision in the end not to publish 
it. The Intro was, as we know, replaced by the terser Preface: and 
some of the central propositions of the Intro are modified, or at least 
suspended, by the time they reached the Preface. Thus, "A general intro­
duction which I had drafted is omitted, since on further consideration, 
it seems to me confusing to anticipate results which have still to be
substantiated, and the reader who really wishes to follow me will have to 
advance from the particular to the general" - an injunction which, superficially, 
at least, appears to reverse the proposition offered in the Intro, to advance 
from the general to the concrete (though, as we shall see, it is one of the 
temptations open to a reading of the Intro which is not sensitive to the Hegelian 
heritage of Marx's thought, to confuse the 'particular* with the 'concrete'). 
Still, an immediate contrast of the Intro with the Preface (where a classical 
conciseness is everywhere in play, quite different from the linguistic playful­
ness and conceit of the Intro) will remind us that, despite its brilliant 
demonstrations and its dense argumentation, the 1857 Intro remains, even with 
respect to Marx's method, provisional.
I
In both the opening and closing sections of the main text of the Intro 
(I omit, for the moment, Marx's very sketchy notes at the end), Marx's reprise 
of his method proceeds via a critique of the methods of political economy.
The first section deals with Production. The object of the inquiry is "material 
production". Smith and Ricardo begin with "the individual and isolated hunter or 
fisherman". Marx, however, begins with 'socially determinate' individuals, and 
hence "socially determined individual production". This marks the beginning of a 
lightning critique of the ideological presuppositions of Political Economy. The 
C18 theorists, up to and including Rousseau, find a general point of. departure in 
'the individual' - projected as an ideal, true for all time. Smith and Ricardo 
take over this ideological projection and found their theories upon it.
Yet 'the individual' cannot be the point of departure, but-only the result. 
Rousseau's 'natural man' appears as a stripping away of the entanglements 
and complexities of modern life, the rediscovery of the natural, universal 
human-individual core beneath. Actually, the whole development of 
'civil society' is subsumed in this aesthetic conceit. It is not until 
labour has been freed of the dependent and restricted forms of feudal
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society, and subject to the enormous revolution it undergoes under 
early capitalism, that the modern concept of 'the individual' could 
appear at all. A whole historical and a whole ideological development, 
then, is already presupposed in - but hidden within - the notion of 
the Natural Individual and of universal 'human nature'.
This is an absolutely characteristic movement of thought in the 
Intro. It takes up the 'given' points of departure in Political 
Economy. It shows by a critique that these are not, in fact, starting 
points but points of arrival. In them, a whole historical development 
is already 'summed up'. In short (to anticipate): what appears as 
the most concrete, common-sense, simple, constituent starting-points 
for a theory of Political Economy, turn out, on inspection, to be 
the sum of many, prior, determinations.
Production outside society is an absurdity: as absured as the notion 
of language without individuals living and talking together. It 
takes, then, a gigantic social development to produce 'the isolated 
individual' producer as a concept: only a highly elaborated form of 
developed social connectedness can appear - take the 'phenomenal form' - 
of men pursuing their egoistic interests as 'indifferent', isolated, 
individuals in a 'free' market organized by an 'invisible hand'. (To 
be strictly accurate, M a m  argues that the "all sided dependence" appears 
as a mutual indifference: however, since the relation must continue to 
be mediated, it is - by the medium of money, which thus comes not only 
to be a 'universal' mediator of equivalent exchanges, but as that which 
regulates the relations between individuals from the outside - "as something 
alien to them, autonomous, as a thing". In this way, the "social connection 
between persons is transformed into a social relation between things".
Note that Marx does not say men become things, but that the relation 
of men/men in exchange is expressed in the form thing/thing; this 
displacement of form enables a relation of mutual interdependence to
6assume the form, appear, as a spontaneously organized relation of 
mutual indifference). "The reciprocal and all-sided dependence of in­
dividuals who are indifferent to one another forms their social connection. 
The social bond is expressed in exchange value” (Grund P156-7).
This concept - that the capitalist mode of production depends on 
social connection assuming the 'ideological' form of an individual 
dis-connection - is one of the great, substantive themes of the 
Grundrisse as a whole. But its working-out also has consequences for 
the problems of method. For the displacement of real relations via their 
ideological representations requires, for its critique, - its unmasking - 
a method which reveals the 'essential relations' behind the necessary but 
mystifying inversions assumed by their "surface forms". This method - 
which, as we shall see later, Marx identifies as the core of what is 
scientific in his dialectic - forms the core methodological procedure, 
not only of this text and of the Notebooks, but of Capital itself. What's 
more, this 'methodological' procedure becomes, once more in its turn, a 
theoretical discovery of the utmost importance: the theoretical discovery 
which in its expanded form (there are several provisional attempts to 
formulate it in the Grund) constitutes the pivotal section, early in 
Capital I. on "'The Fetishism Of Commodities" and is in fact the basis 
of what we can only call-the mature theory of ideology embedded in 
Capital.itself. . (The crucial references here are Geras, "Marx & The 
Critique of Political Economy", in Blackburn: John Mepham, "The Theory 
of Ideology In Capital", Radical Philosophy. Cf. also my paper, "Structure 
And Forms: Marx's Mature Theory Of Ideology") (Early•examples of the 
theme of connection/indifference and of the application of the phenomenal 
form/real relation distinction in method are: Grundrisse, the "Chapter 
on Money", PI56-16 5, end the "Chapter on Capital", esp. P2hl-7).
The Introduction, then, opens with this methodological argument: the 
critique of certain .'normal' types of logical abstraction. The argument
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is basic to any discussion of Marx’s method. 'Political Economy' 
operates as a theory through its categories. How are these categories 
formed? The normal method is to try to isolate and analyse a category 
in terms of those elements which remain 'common' to its empirical-historical 
referent through all epochs and all types of social formation. This 
attempt to identify, by means of the logic ‘ of abstraction, as the 
core of a concept or category, those parts of it which remain common 
and stable through history is really a type of 'essentialism'. This 
search for the stable essence is precisely what marks out 'vulgar'
Political Economy as, fundamentally, an ideology, an apologetics, founded 
on the cart-horse of 'common-sense'. But, in its more sophisticated
forms (that is, in the forms of theorizing which, for Marx, represented 
the most advanced modes of thought in bourgeois society), the search for 
'essences' is not absent, even though arrived at in more sophisticated ways. 
Hegel, the .summit of classical German philosophy, developed a mode of 
thought which was the very opposite of static: his grasp of movement and 
of contradiction is what raised him above all other forms of logical 
theorizing available to him, in Marx's eyes. Yet, because the movement of 
the dialectic was cast, for Hegel, in an idealist form, his thought 
retained the notion of the 'essential core' which survived all the motions 
of mind. It was the perpetuation of this 'essential core' within the 
concept which, Marx believed, constituted the secret guarantee within 
Hegel's dialectic of the ultimate harmoniousness of existing social 
relations (e.g. The Prussian State): a point of arrival, in Hegel, which 
never ceased both to alarm and confuse his 'left' disciples. Similarly, 
despite its significant theoretical advances, Political Economy, too, 
speaks of 'bourgeois' production and of private property as if these were 
the secret 'core' or 'essence' of the concepts 'production' and 'property': 
as if these latest forms exhausted the historical content of the categories.
In this way, Political Economy too presented the capitalist mode of production,
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not as a historical structure and creation, the work of men under certain 
conditions, and thus subject to the movement of historical forces, but 
as the natural and inevitable state of things, economically. In this 
way, bourgeois thought helped to •naturalize1 (i.e. to pass off a historical 
structure as a natural product) the form of society which gave rise to it.
At this level, classical Political Economy (despite its enormous scientific 
advances over its 'vulgar* forms) retained an ideological presupposition 
at its 'scientific' heart.
In criticizing this mode of theorizing, in terms of the reduction 
of specific historical relations to their lowest-common, trans-historical 
essence, Marx begins to distinguish the method of historical materialism 
from the modes of theorizing from which, at another level, his own thought 
made its first, decisive departure. The argument here - still in a fairly
. X
simple form - fleetingly anticipates the alternative which he develops 
more fully in the subsequent pages. There is no ’production-in-general’ 
(just as there is no ideology-in-general): only distinct forms of 
production, - specific to time and conditions. (One of those distinct forms 
is - rather confusingly - 'general production’: i.e. production based on 
a specific kind of labour, labour which is not specific to a particular 
branch of production, but which has been 'generalized': 'abstract labour'. 
But we shall come to that in a moment). Since any mode of production 
depends upon 'determinate conditions' ("socially determined individual 
production": Grund. P83)» there can be no guarantee, outside history, 
outside its specific, concrete conditions, that those conditions will 
always be fulfilled, or remain constant through time. Except in the most 
common-sense way, there is no scientific sense in which the concept 
'production', referring to the capitalist mode, and entailing as one of its 
required conditions, 'free labour', can be said to have an immediate 
identity' (i.e. to be 'essentially the same as') production in, say, slave,
-  9 -
clan or communal society. (Later, in Capital, Marx is to'remind us 
that this transformation of feudal bondsmen into 'free labour', which 
appears as a 'natural' precondition for capitalism, has, indeed, a 
specific history: "the history of..this expropriation is written in the 
annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire": Cap I, P715)* This 
is one of the key points-of-departure of historical materialism as a '
method of thought and practice. Nothing in what Marx subsequently wrote 
allows us to fall behind it. It is what Korsch called Marx's principle 
of 'historical specification'. The 'unity' which Marx's method is 
intended to produce is not this weak identity achieved by abstracting 
away everything of any historical specificity until we are left with an 
essential core, without differentiation or specification.
The Introduction thus begins, as Nicolaus remarks, as the provisional, 
extended answer to an unwritten question: Political Economy is our 
starting point, but, however valid are some of its theories, it has not 
formulated scientifically the laws of the inner structure of the mode of 
production whose categories it expresses and theoretically reflects. It 
"sticks", despite everything, inside its "bourgeois skin" (Cap I, P5^2). This 
has to do with the fact that, within it, historical relations have "already 
acquired the stability of natural, self-understood forms of social life". (P75)« 
Its categories, then, "are forms of thought expressing with social validity 
jTnote well / the conditions and relations of a definite, historically 
determined mode of production" (Cap I, P?6). But it presents these relations 
as "a self-evident necessity imposed by Nature as productive labour itself" 
(ibid, P8l). Thus, though Political Economy in its classical form (Cf: 
the footnote on ibid P81 distinguishing 'classical' from 'vulgar' Pol. Econ.) 
has "discovered what lies beneath these forms", it has not asked 
certain key questions (e.g. the origin of commodity-production based 
on labour-power: "the form under which value becomes exchange-value") 
which are peculiar to specific historical conditions (the forms and conditions
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of commodity-production). These 'errors* are not incidental. They 
are already present, in its presuppositions, its method, its starting 
points. But, if Political Economy is itself to he transcended, how?
Where to begin?
The answer is, with "production by social individuals", "pro­
duction at a definite stage of social development". Political Economy 
tends to etherealize, universalize and de-historicize the relations of 
.bourgeois production. But what follows if, as Marx does, we insist on 
starting with a principle, of historical specification? Do we then, never­
theless, assume that there is some common, universal practice - "production- 
in-general" - which has always existed, which has then been subject to 
an evolutionary historical development which can be steadily traced 
through: a practice which, therefore, we can reduce to its common-sense 
content and employ as the obvious, uncontested starting-point for analysis?
The answer is, No. Whatever other kind of 'historicist Marx was (and the 
principle of 'historical specificity' reminds us of the fundamentally 
historical cast of his thought), he was definitively not a historical 
evolutionist. Every child knows, he once remarked, that production cannot 
cease for a moment (Letter.to Kugelmann). So, there must be something 'in 
common', so to speak, which corresponds to the idea of 'production-in­
general': all societies must produce the conditions of their livelihood 
and thus reproduce themselves one way or another. This is,the type of 
abstraction which sifts out the lowest common characteristics of a concept 
and identifies this unproblematic core with its scientific content. But 
it is a mode of theorizing which operates at a very low theoretical, 
threshold indeed. It is, at best, a useful time-saver. But, to penetrate 
a structure as dense and overlaid with false representations as .the 
capitalist mode of production, we need concepts more fundamentally dialectical 
in character. Concepts which allow us to further refine, segment, split 
and recombine any general category: which allows us to. see those features
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which permitted it to play a certain role in this epoch, other features 
which were developed under the specific conditions of that epoch, 
distinctions which enable us to understand why certain relations appear 
only in the most ancient and the most developed forms of society 
and in none in between. Such concepts are far in advance of those which 
unite tinder one chaotic general heading the quote different things which 
have appeared, at one time or another, appeared under the heading, 
production-in-general. Conceptions which differentiate in the very
moment that they reveal hidden connections. In much the same way,
Marx observes that concepts which differentiate out what makes possible 
the specific development of different languages is more significant than 
'abstracting' a few, simple, basic, common 'language universals'.
We must observe - 5.t is a common strategy throughout the Intro - that 
Marx establishes his difference here both from the. method, of Political 
Economy and from Hegel. . The Intro is thus, simultaneously,' a critique 
of both. It is useful,rin this context, to recall Marx's earlier 
procedure in the famous Chapter on "The Metaphysics of Political Economy", 
in The Poverty of Philosophy, where he, again, simultaneously offers 
a critique of 'Hegelianised Political Economy' in- his;attack on Proudhon.
The terms of this later critique of Proudhon are particularly germane 
to this argument against 'abstraction' as a;procedure, for it serves to remind 
us that something more than a mere logical quibble is involved: "Is it 
surprising that, if you let drop little by little all that.constitutes the 
individuality of a house, leaving out first of all the materials of which 
it is composed, then the form that,distinguishes it, you end up with nothing 
but a body; that if you leave out-of account the limits of this body, 
you soon have nothing but a space - that if, finally, you leave out of 
account the dimensions of this space, there is absolutely nothing left but 
quantity, the logical category? If we abstract thus from every subject 
all the alleged accidents,, animate or inanimate, men or things,, we are right 
in saying that in the final abstraction; the only substance left is the
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logical categories. ..If all, that exists, all that lives on land and 
under water can be reduced by abstraction to a logical category - if the 
whole world can be drowned thus is a world of abstractions, in the world of 
logical categories - who need be astonished at it?" Apply this method to 
the categories of political economy, Marx argues, "and you have the logic 
and metaphysics of political economy" - "the categories that everybody 
knows, translated into a little-known language which makes them look as if 
they had newly blossomed forth in an intellect of pure reason." "Up to now", 
Marx adds, "we have expounded only the dialectics of Hegel. We shall see 
later how M. Proudhon has succeeded in reducing it to the meanest proportions. 
Thus for Hegel, all that has happened and is still happening is only just 
what is happening in his own mind..There is no longer 'a history according 
to the order of time', there is only the 'sequence of ideas in the 
understanding". (Poverty of Philosophy, P118-9, 121).
Marx had long ago noted ('Critique of Hegel's Dialectic*) Hegel's 
"outstanding achievement": his recognition that the different categories 
of the world - "private right, morality, the family, civil society, the 
state, etc" - had "no validity in isolation", but "dissolve and engender 
one another. They have become 'moments' of the movement'. He had also 
grasped "the self-creation of man as process". However, as we know,
Marx radically criticized Hegel for conceiving this "mobile nature" of 
the categories as a form of "self-genesis", as "merely formal because 
abstract", and thus as "stopping short at the last act". Hegel "conceives 
them only in their thought form".' Thus "The whole movement..ends in 
absolute knowledge". (EfW P190, Bott l8Vf, P200). The apparent constitution 
of the real world becomes, in Hegel, "merely the appearance, the cloak, the 
exoteric form" of movement and contradiction, which, in the speculative 
conception, never really deserts the ground of thought. "The whole history 
of alienation and of the retraction of alienation is therefore only the 
history of the production of abstract thought, i.e. of absolute, logical,
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speculative thought”. This was certainly not the simple, trans-historical, 
external connections established by vulgar forms of Political Economy, but 
an equally unacceptable alternative: the 'immediate1 identity of opposites, 
the ultimate identity of Mind with itself "only in..thought form". Marsj 
himself added, "This means that v/hat Hegel does is to put in place of these 
fixed abstractions the act of abstraction which revolves in its own circle". 
He put it even more clearly in The Holy Family:. "The Phenomenology..ends 
by putting .in place of all human existence 'absolute knowledge'.. Instead 
of treating self-consciousness as the self-consciousness of real men, living 
in a real objective world and conditioned by it, Hegel transforms men into 
an attribute of self-consciousness. He turns the world upside down".
The same point is made in the Poverty of Philosophy: "He thirks he is
r
constructing the world by the movement of thought, whereas he is merely 
reconstructing systematically and classifying by the absolute method the 
thoughts which are in the minds of all". (P121). The essence of the critique 
is the same as Marx offers on several other occasions, including the 1857 
Intro. Hegel did understand 'production', he did understand 'labour': 
but ultimately, it was what Marx called, "labour of the mind, labour of 
thinking and knowing" (EEfrl Mf). However dialectical however supercessive 
its movement, the historical production of the world remains, for Hegel, 
'moments' of the realization of the Idea, the "external appearances" of 
thought - stations of the cross in the path of Mind towards Absolute 
Knowledge. The unity ('identity') which Marx proposes in the Intro is nqt 
of this kind: it is to be discovered in the real, concrete relations: a 
unity of many determinations, in which, however, "essential differences" 
are preserved.
Marx ends this section with an illustration. Economists like Mill 
start from bourgeois relations of production, and extrapolate them as 
"inviolable natural laws". All production, they assert, despite historic 
differences, can be subsumed under the generalized concept of universal
human laws. Two such 'laws1 are (a) production requires private property, 
(b) production requires the protection of property by the courts and police. 
Actually, Marx argues, private property is neither the only nor the earliest 
form of property: historically, it is predated by communal property.
And the presence of modern, bourgeois legal relations and the police, far 
from indexing the universality of the system, shows how each mode of 
production requires, and produces, its own lega-juridical and political 
structures and relations. What is common to production, then, as 
produced by the process of mental abstraction of its 'common' attributes, 
cannot enable us to grasp, concretely, any single, "real historical 
stage of production".
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II
Next, then, how, are we to conceptualize the relation between the 
different phases of production - production, distribution, exchange, 
consumption? Can we conceive them / as the Dobb translation puts it /
"as organically coherent factors", or simply as "brought into haphazard 
relation with one another, i.e. into a simple reflex connection".?
This is no simple matter. Marx is, throughout his later work,.insisting 
that the superiority of the dialectical method lies, in part, in its 
ability to trace out the 'inner connexion' between the different elements 
in a mode of production, as against their haphazard, and extrinsic 'mere 
juxtaposition'. The method which merely sets opposites together in 
an external way: which assumes that, because things are neighbours, they 
must therefore be related, but which cannot move from oppositions to 
contradictions, (where an inner connexion must be traced between things 
otherwise merely juxtaposed), is dialectical only in its surface form.
The syllogism is one of the logical forms of an argument by external 
juxtaposition. Political Economy 'thinks' production, consumption etc in 
this syllogistic form: production produces goods: distribution allocates 
them: exchange makes the general distribution of goods specific to 
particular individuals: finally, the individual consumes them. This 
is almost a structural-functional paradigm for production. Marx, 
interestingly, also glosses it satirically in a Hegelian fashion, by 
adopting some of Hegel’s categories for the syllogism from the Logic: 
production could be thought of as the Hegelian 'generality', or 'universality', 
consumption as 'particularity', exchange as 'singularity'. (Cf: Marx's 
use of the terms, in Grund P^50, and the reference to their source in 
Hegel's Logic,P600, in the footnote, Grund P^50)• There are many ways
in which Marx may be said to have remained a Hegelian; but the use of 
Hegelian triads (thesis, antithesis, synthesis) and syllogisms (general,
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particular, singular) is not one of them. The coherence such syllogisms 
suggest may be real enough, but they remain conceptually extremely shallow. 
Even'the critics of this position, Marx adds, have not taken their critique 
far enough. The critics say that the relations between these spheres have 
not been adequately formulated, theoretically. For Marx, however, the 
critique runs deeper. It refers, again, to his earlier critique of Hegel, 
a matter,as we have suggested, for all practical purposes, 'settled1 for 
Marx by'the 18^ * 5. The critics assume that to syllogism is wrong because 
it contains a logical error - a textbook mistake. For Marx, the error 
is conceptual because it is a taking over into thought of the mystifications 
which exist in the real relations of bourgeois production, where production, 
distribution and consumption do indeed, appear as "independent, autonomous 
neighbours", but where this appearance is false, an inversion. What Marx 
is criticizing the Hegelian syllogism for here is precisely that which some 
recent expositors of the Intro, including Althusser, believe the Intro 
to support: namely, the illusion that conceptual mistakes can be clarified 
by a theoretical practice alone, that is 'wholly within thought'.
In that difficult l8Mt text The Critique of Hegel's Dialectic, to which 
we have already referred, Marx had remarked that, in Hegel, the 
supercession of one category by another appears to be a "transcending 
of the thought entity". However, in Hegel, thought treats even the 
Objectively-created moments as 'moments' of itself - "because the object has 
become for it a moment of thought, thought takes it in its reality to be a 
self-confirmation of itself" (P186, EPM). Thus "this superceding in thought, 
which leaves its object standing in the real world, believes that it has 
really overcome it". There is no true 'profane history' here, no "actual 
realization ■ for man of man' s essence and of his essence as-something real" 
(PI87). If, for Hegel, philosophy supercedes religion, it is not "real 
religion, the real state, or real nature, but religion itself already as an 
object of knowledge". (EPM, P186). Thus, "The history of man is transformed
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into the history of an abstraction" (The Holy Family). The objectivating 
movement of thought therefore remains ultimately confined within its own 
circle: "Hegel has locked up all these fixed mental forms together in 
his Logic laying hold of each of them first as negation - that is, as an 
alienation of human thought - and then as negation of the negation - that 
is, as a superceding of those alienation, as a real expression of human 
thought. But as even this still takes place within the confines of the 
estrangement, this negation of the negation is in part the restoring of 
these fixed forms in their estrangement". Even Nature in Hegel, Marx 
says, "has shown itself to be the Idea in the form of other-being".
(EPM, P190, 192). Thus "The act of abstraction..revolves within its 
own circle". The language is, again, headily Hegelian-Feuerbachean..
How much cleaner the blow is in the 1857 text: "as if the task were the 
dialectical balancing of concepts, and not the grasping of real relations". 
"As if this rupture had made its way not from reality into the textbooks, 
but rather from the textbooks into reality". (Intro, P90).
Thus, neither the functional disconnectedness of Political Economy 
nor the formal supercessions of the Hegelian Logic will serve to reveal 
the inner connexion betv/een processes and relations in society, which are 
deeply interpenetrated, which form ’a-, unity' of a distinct type, but which 
must be grasped as differentiated, as real processes in the real world, 
not merely the formal movement of the act of abstraction itself. It 
is because, in the 'real relations' of capitalist production, the different 
parts of the process appear, simply, as independent, autonomous "neighbours" 
that they appear, in the textbooks, as linked by an accidental connection.
But, how then to think the relations of identity, similarity, mediateness and 
difference which could produce, at the conceptual level, in thought, a 
'thought-concrete' adequate in its complexity to the complexity of the 'real
relations' which is its object?
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The most compressed and difficult pages of the Intro, which immediately 
follow, provide an answer to this question. This forms the sections of 
the text which deal with the relations between production, distribution, 
consumption and exchange. Since some of the thorniest problems of any 
•reading' of this text occur here, it is worthwhile listing some of the 
difficulties before plunging into exposition. First, we must beware of 
collapsing too swiftly or blurring the distinctions between Hegelian 
and Marxian 'identities', and thus indistinctly placing the so-called 'break' 
between Hegel and Marx. This pivots on the question - secondly' - as to 
whether or not we must read most of this section 'ironically': that is, as 
merely 'coquetting' with Hegelian modes of expression - to be followed (perhaps 
in Section 3) by Marx's own, quite distinct, and preferred method. Third, 
we must beware of reading this text 'progressively': that is, unwarrantably 
bringing back into our reading of the 1857 Intro concepts which belong 
to still later, and unanticipated, phases of Marx's work. Fourth, how 
much is Marx already thinking the problems of analysing a social formation 
in terms of historical process, limits, contradictions and interruptions?
Fifth, hew far is the question of 'determination' central to this text?
Why and how, for example, can it be said - as Marx does here - that 'production 
ultimately determines'? And is this finding imported as a premise into 
the text, or argued through? The answers to these questions will not, of 
course, be conclusively provided by a 'reading'; but only a 'reading' which 
is attentive to the actual movement of the argument in the text can lend one 
or other way of resolving these puzzles the sort of supporting evidence 
they require. It is to be hoped that the rather laborious exposition which 
follows, and on which we. attempt to found such a 'reading', will also be 
rewarding in this way.
The methodological issue here is, precisely, how are the 1relations' 
of material production to be thought? What mode of conceptualizing the 
relations between the different levels or 'movements' of a social formation
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which is /'complexly structured' will be adequate? There are two special 
difficulties with the text at this point., which we must note. The first 
is this: On P90-92, Marx explores different types of identity-relations.
These are neatly summarised,on P93, as constituting three rather distinct 
types. However, as the distinctions are actually made in the text, 
the three types are not neatly discriminated, but tend rather to unfold 
into one another. This is especially true of the distinction between 
the second and the third type of 'identity' between production and 
consumption. The second, related issue is this: does Marx make a 
clean break with some or all of the Hegelian 'identities': if so, 
where does the break occur? if not, what then is the nature of the critique 
which he offers on P9^, with the pivotal sentence beginning, "The important 
thing to emphasize here is only that.."
We can now look more closely at the text. Start with production.
In production, individuals 'consume' their abilities, they 'use up' raw 
materials. In this sense, there is a kind of consumption inside production: 
production and consumption are here "directly coincident". Marx notes, 
however, that Political Economy was already well aware of this consumption- 
inside-production, and allowed for it in the concept, "productive consumption". 
Marx does not directly say whether or not he regards this 'direct identity' 
as correct or not. Clearly, he believes it to be inadequate. My own 
.understanding is that he thought it 'right enough', though - as he says earlier 
(P88) and later (P100) of other formulations - "trite and obvious", or 
"tautologous" or 'true at a.rather.simple level', but still offering only 
a 'chaotic conception', and thus requiring "further determinations", greater 
analytical development: but I cannot substantiate that reading from the 
text itself. The inadequacy.of this type of 'immediate identity', however, 
is clearly signalled in Marx's reference to Spinoza. Spinoza's 'identity', 
as the footnote reminds us, is one where an "undifferentiated identity" 
cannot support the introduction of more refined "particular determinations".
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However, in so far as 'immediate identities' reign, identical propositions 
can be reversed. If A = B, then B = A. Marx, then, reverses the: 
proposition. Thus, if there is a consumption-inside-production, there 
is, also "immediately" production-inside-consumption. The consumption 
of food, for example, is the means whereby the individual produces, 
or reproduces, his physical existence. If 'productive consumption', 
then also 'consumptive production'. Now Political Economy employs these 
distinctions simply in order to separate out the consumptive aspects of 
production (e.g. the consumption of raw materials) from production 
proper. Production, as a distinct category, remains. The "immediate 
identity" thus leaves their "duality intact". It is precisely the 
criticism which Marx originally delivered on Hegel in the l8Mt fragment 
on the Critique of the Hegelian Philosophy As A Whole: "this superceding in 
thought which leaves its object standing in the real world, believes it has 
really overcome it".
Marx, however, now reiterates (P91) - I think we must read the passage 
as if delivered in his own voice: "Production then is also immediately 
consumption" and vice versa. But now he adds a second type of relation: 
that of mediation: the relation of "mutual dependence". Production 
and consumption also mediate one another. It is important to understand 
precisely what Marx means by 'mediate* here. He means that each cannot 
exist or complete its passage and achieve its result without the other.
Each is the other's completion. This is achieved by each providing 
within itself the other's object. Thus, production's product is what 
rconsumption consumes. Consumption's 'needs*’are what production is aimed 
to satisfy. The mediation here is 'teleological'. Each fihds its 
end in the other. In this mediating movement, Marx later observes (P93), 
each side is "indispensible" to the other; but they are not identical - 
they remain "external to each other".
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Marx now dives in to say precisely how each produces the other.
It is here that the distinctions begun to slide towards one another.
In analysing how consumption completes production (second type of relation), 
and vice versa, Marx also covers ground which he is later to resume as 
belonging to the third type of identity: that in which "each creates the 
other in completing itself and creates itself as the other". The text 
tends to slide between these two senses. Consumption produces production 
in two ways. First, (P93) because production's object - the product - is 
only finally 'realized' when it is consumed. Here Marx makes use of a 
distinction, which is more fully developed in Capital I (P180-1). Production 
is something 'in itself* - "objectified activity", but it is also, in 
another form, something for the next part of the process, consumption: 
it is a finished object - an object "for consumption's active subject."
In Capital, Marx noted that in production, "The process disappears in the 
product." "Labour has incorporated itself with its subject: the former is 
materialized, the latter transformed. That which in the labourer appeared 
as movement, now appears in the product as fixed quality without motion.
The blacksmith forges and the product is a forging". It is in the passage 
of the forms, from productive activity to objectified product, that the 
mediating movement between production and consumption is accomplished.
But, secondly, consumption produces production by creating the need 
for "new production". I believe it is crucial, for the later discussion 
of the determinacy of production in the process as a whole, that what 
consumption now does, strictly speaking, is to provide the "ideal, internally 
impelling cause", the "motive", "internal image", "drive" "purpose" for 
re-production. Marx stresses "new production": and it is, strictly speaking, 
and significantly, the need to reproduce for which consumption is made 
mediately responsible.
In "correspondingly" the same way, production produces consumption.
■ ' , v  •
Marx notes three senses in which this is true. First, production furnishes
consumption with, its 'object1. Second, production also specifies the 
mode in which that object is consumed. But, third, production produces 
the need which its object satisfies. This is a difficult concept to 
grasp, for we normally think of consumption's needs and modes as the 
property of the consumer (i.e. belonging to 'consumption'), existing 
in their own right, separate from the object which, so to speak, satisfies. 
But, as early as the 18H  Mss, especially in the section on "Private 
Property And Communism", Marx, in speaking of man's subjective powers 
as 'objective', had pointed to the way in which needs are the product of 
an historical development, not the trans-historical subjective property of 
individuals, developing in and through a constant reciprocal appropriation 
of the objective world subjectively. "The manner in which they £ objects_7 
become his depends on the nature of the objects and on the nature of the 
essential power corresponding to it: for it is precisely the determinate 
nature of this relationship which shapes the particular, real mode of 
affirmation. To the eye an object is another object than the object of 
the ear" (l8Mf Mss, Plto). In short, if consumption of the object produces 
the subjective impulse to produce anew, the production of the object 
creates, in the consumer, specific, historically distinct and developed 
modes of apprehension - "perception" - and, simultaneously, develops the 
'need' which the object satisfies. "Music alone awakens in man the sense 
of music", he said in 18V+. Thus the "forming of the senses" is the 
subjective side of an objective labour, the product of "the entire history 
of the world down to the present." (EPM P1*H). "The production of new 
needs in the first historical act", he observed in the GI. Here, "the 
object of art..creates a public which is sensitive to art". (Intro V92) 
Production, then, forms objectively the subjective needs and modes of 
the consumer, just as consumption reproduces production as a subjectively- 
experienced impulse, drive or motive. The complex shifts between objective 
subjective dimensions which are tersely accomplished in this passage seem 
to be incomprehensible without the gloss I have offered from the 18M* Mss,
.even if, here, the language of 'species being' has altogether vanished.
The argument is now resumed (Intro., P 93)• There are three kinds 
of identity relation. First, immediate identity - where production and 
consunption are "immediately" one another. Second, mutual dependence - 
where each is "indispensable" to the other, and cannot be completed without 
it, but where production and consumption remain "external" to one another. 
This is the condition of reciprocally sustaining but different, a relation 
which is necessary but which does not abolish distinctions. Thirdly - a 
relation, which has no precise title, but which is clearly that of an 
internal connexion between two sides which are, crucially, linked by the 
passage of forms, by real processes through historical time: and where, as 
compared with relation (2), production not only proceeds to its completion 
in production, but is itself reproduced again through consumption. I 
think this reading is justified by Marx's observation that, in this third 
type of relation, each "creates the other in completing itself and creates 
itself as the other". I think it is also justified by Marx's insistence 
that "in the first.act of production", an "inclination" is raised which, 
then, produces "the need for repetition". Thus, the 'first act' of 
production has a determining power to form, subjectively, a need, impulse, 
motive, and that this need then has the power to set or spark the circuit 
into motion once again. Here we find not only what distinguishes the third 
type of relation from the second; but also, what permits Marx, on the 
succeeding page (P 9*0, to give a final determinacy to production over 
consumption. Production, he argues, initiates the cycle: in its "first 
act", it forms the object, the mode and the need to consume: what consumption 
can then do is, to "raise the inclination developed in the first act of 
production through the need for repetition to its finished form". Production, 
then, requires the passage through consumption to commence its work anew; 
but in providing^the act through which the whole process again runs its 
course", production retains a primary determination over the circuit as a 
.whole. My, own view is that some of Marx's most crucial and sophisticated
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distinctions, developed later in Capital - those between single production
and expanded reproduction - achieve a gnomic, philosophic, first-formulation
in this elliptical passage. It should be noted that, in this third relation,
production and consumption are no longer external to each other: nor do
they ’'immediately" merge. Rather, they are linked by an "inner connexion".
Yet this 'inner connexion' is not that of a simple identity, which requires
only the reversal and inversion of the terms of the syllogism into one
another. The inner connexion here passes through a distinct process; it
is what Marx, in his earlier critique of Hegel, called a "profane" history,
a process in the real world, a process through historical time, each moment
of which, in requiring its own determinate conditions is, subject to its
own inner laws, and yet is incomplete without.the other.
We may represent the distinctions thus:
(1) Production = Consumption
(Consumption) (Production)
(-Inside Production) (-Inside-Consumption)
-  2k  -
(2) Production — — 7 (object)-- Consumption //
Consumption—
(3) Production ------ object ------ Consumption — ---- New Production
mode product, ;
need drive, motive,impulse
-----  -------- - --
A relation of the third type could - speculatively - be truncated 
or foreshortened: it could now be read simply as a rather complicated way 
of expressing a relation of the first type: i.e. an "immediate identity".
Why is relation 3 not an "immediate identity" of the Hegelian type?
Marx gives three reasons. First, an immediate identity would assume that 
production and consumption had a single subject. This concept - of the 
identity of the 'subject' through all its successive 'moments' of 
realization - is a pivotal aspect of Hegel's 'essentialism'. It is this 
positing of a 'single subject' which allowed Hegel to conceive the historical 
world as, ultimately, a harmonious circuit, a circuit with mounting contradictions 
but ultimately without breaks: from that it was but a step to establishing
the 'immediate identity' of the Rational with the Real, and thus the harmony 
between the exalted movements of Objective Mind and the sordid particularities 
of the Prussian state. In the real historical world, however, the 'subject' 
of production and consumption are not one. Capitalists produce: workers 
consume. The process links them: but their intents are not immediate.
Second, these are not Hegelian 'moments' of a single act, which are 
only the fleeting and temporary realizations of the march of objective Mind 
or the World Spirit. These are the circuits of a process, an historical 
process with "real points of departure": a process through time, where"the 
whole process again runs its course": a process with specific forms through 
which value is prescribed to pass "for its ^"realization"^.
Third, whereas Hegel's identities form a self-regulating self-sustaining 
circuit, in which no one moment has priority, Marx insists that the 
historical process through which production and consumption "create the 
other in completing itself" has its breaks, its determinations, its moment 
of determinacy. Production, not consumption, initiates the circuit. 
Consumption is then required if the cycle of production/consumption is to 
be renewed. But this necessary condition for value's 'realization' cannot 
destroy the 'over-determinacy' of the moment from which realization departs.
The significance of these distinctions is delivered in the closing 
paragraph (P 9*0, which also opens into the new, third, section. It relates 
to an earlier argument. Marx knows that capitalism tends to reproduce itself 
in expanded form as if it were a self-equilibrating and self-sustaining system. 
The.so-called "laws of equivalence" are the necessary surface forms of this 
self-generation of the system. On P 161 of the Grund he remarks that "this 
is precisely the beauty and greatness of it: this spontaneous interconnection, 
this material and mental metabolism which is independent of the knowing and 
willing of individuals and which presupposes their reciprocal independence 
and indifference". But it is absolutely crucial - the pivot of the difference 
both between himself and Hegel and himself and the Political Economists -
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that this equilibrating movement has no eternal, no ethereal guarantees*
, "But.this constant tendency to equilibrium of the various spheres of 
production is exercised only in the shape of a reaction against the 
constant upsetting of this equilibrium’1» (Cap I, P 356). Each ’moment' - 
apparently so perfectly linked to the next - retains the essential 
difference between the various social subjects: each has its social 
'conditions'- each is subject to its own social laws: indeed, each is 
linked to-the other in the circuit by other, quite distinct, though 
determinate, processes. Thus, there-is no guarantee to the producer - 
the capitalist - that what he produces will return again to him: he 
cannot appropriate it "immediately". The circuits of capital "depend 
on his relation to other individuals". Indeed, a whole, intermediate or 
"mediating movement" now intervenes - 'hteps between" producers and 
products; determining but "in accordance with social laws", what will 
return to the producer as his share in the augmented world of products 
which his production has sent on their passage towards their 'realization' 
in'consumption. Nothing except the maintenance of these determinate 
conditions, nothing but the operation of these•'social laws' can 
guarantee the continuity of the mode of production over time. "Just as 
the exchange value of the commodity leads a double existence, as the 
particular commodity and as money, so does the act of exchange split into 
two mutually independent acts: exchange of commodities for money, exchange 
of money for commodities; purchase and sale. Since these have now achieved 
a spatially and temporally separate and mutually indifferent form of 
existence, "their immediate identity ceases. They may correspond or not; 
they may balance or not; they may enter into disproportion with one another. 
They will, of course, always attempt to equalize one another; but in the 
place of the earlier immediate equality there now stands the constant 
movement of equalization, which evidently presupposes constant non- 
equivalence. It is now entirely possible that consonance may be reached 
only by passing through the most extreme dissonance." (Grund. P 1^8)
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It is, in short, a finite historical system, a system capable cf breaks, 
discontinuities, contradictions, interruptions: a system with limits, 
within historical time. It is a system which rests on the mediating 
movement of other processes not yet named: for example - distribution.
Is distribution, then, 'immediate with' production and consumption? Is 
it inside or outside production: is it an autonomous or a determinate sphere?
In the first section, Marx establishes the couplet - production- 
consumption - in terms of an immediate Hegelian unity: opposites/identical.
He then dismantles the production-consumption couplet by the terras of a 
Marxian transformation: opposites - mediated - mutually dependent—  
differentiated unity (not identical). In part, this is accomplished by 
wresting from apparently equivalent relations a moment of determinacy: 
production. In the second section (P 9*0 the second couplet - production- 
distribution is dismantled by means of a different transformation: 
determined/determining/determinate.
Marx notes that, in Political Economy, everything appears twice.
Capital is a factor of production: but also a form of distribution, in the 
shape of interest + profits. Wages are a factor of production but also a 
form of distribution. Pent is a form of distribution: but also - in its 
landed property form - a factor of production. Each element, then,, 
appears as both determining and determined. What breaks this seamless 
circle of determinations? This can only be done by reading back from 
the apparent identity of the categories to their differentiated pre­
suppositions . (This 'reading back' to the historical presuppositions of 
categories takes us back to the very beginning of the Intro - to P 8^,85 
in particular'.)
Here, once again, Marx is concerned to establish the moments of 
break, of doterminacy, in the self-sustaining circuits of capital. Two 
of the finest glosses on this passage are to be found in the dismantling 
of the theory of wages in Capital II, in the unpacking of the Trinity 
Formula in Capital III. Vulgar Economy assumed a perfect fit between the
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social processes of capital# This was expressed in the Trinitarian formula* 
Each factor of production was returned its just rewards in distribution: 
capital - profits; Land - ground rent; Labour - wages* Thus each bit 
"appeared twice1*, by grace of a secret assumed 'natural harmony* or compact 
with its identical opposite. We cannot follow in full the say in which 
this Formula is dismantled in Capital* Cf: Capital III P 963-7* The 
procedure in the Intro is briefer. Distribution appears to be, in common 
sense, the prime mover of the system. It casts the agents of production 
into their income classes, assigns each individual to his position. It 
is distribution which, appears 'determining*. Yet, Marx suggests, behind 
the obvious forms of distribution, (wages, rent, interest) lie, not simply 
economic categories, but real, historic relations: relations which stem 
from the movement and formation of capital under specific conditions.
Thus wages presuppose, not labour, but labour in a specific form: wage- 
labcur (slave labour has no wages). Ground rent presupposes large-scale 
landed property (there is no ground rent in communal society). Interest 
and profit presuppose capital in its modern form. Wage-labour, landed 
property and capital are not, however, forms of distribution but 'moments' 
of the organization of the capitalist mode of production: they initiate 
the distributive forms (wages, rent, profits), not vice versa. In this 
sense, distribution, which is, of course, a differentiated system, is 
nevertheless over-determined by the structures of production. What is 
more, before distribution can take place in the form of wages, rent and 
profits, a prior kind of 'distribution* must take place: the distribution 
of the means of production between expropriators and expropriated, and 
the distinction of the members of society, the classes, into the different 
branches of production. This prior distribution - of the means and of the 
agents of production into the social relations of production - belongs to 
production: the distribution of its products, its results, in the form of
wages or rent, cannot be its starting point. This is the most extensive
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passage in which the prior determination of production over distribution 
is established in the 1857 manuscript.
The sense in which production, finally, determines, as the 'real 
point of departure* is, however, itself subject to important qualification 
(P 97)* For production to take place, the instruments of production must 
be distributed; and men distributed as between the classes of production 
(''subsumed under specific conditions of production"). This is a kind of 
distribution: one which, fundamentally, Marx subsumes trader production.
At this level, production requires its own sort of distribution.
Production, however, does not appear utterly without its own 'determinations'. 
Once this distribution of instruments S: agents has been made, they form 
the starting conditions for the realization of value within the mode.
Only then can distribution in its more normal sense - distribution of the 
products, whether in the form of wages, rent or profit - take place. This 
second type of distribution, however, is clearly subordinate to production 
in this wider, mode-specific sense, and must be considered as determinate 
to it.
When we come to the third section,(P 98) Exchange, then, the 
demonstration is even briefer, more abrupt. Exchange, too,is an "aspect
of production". It mediates between production and consumption, but,
\
again, as its presupposition, it requires determinate conditions which can 
only be established within production: the division of labour, production 
in its private exchange form, the development and structure
of production in the form, say, of exchanges between town and country. And 
this argument leads, almost at once, to a conclusion - it is a conclusion, 
not simply to the section on Exchange, but to the whole problem posed on 
P 88. Production, distribution, consumption and exchange are not 
adequately conceptualized as immediate identities, unfolding, within the 
essentialist Hegelian dialectic, to their monistic categorical resolution.
This eternally monistic circularity is, if not broken and buried, then 
suspended. Essentially, we must 'think' the relations between the different
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processes of material production as "members of a totality, distinctions 
within a unity". That is, as a complexly structured differentiated totality, 
in which distinctions are not obliterated but preserved - the unity of its 
'necessary complexity' precisely requiring differentiation. Here again, 
as we noted earlier, one of the central distinctions between a Hegelian 
and a Marxism method is pinpointed.
Hegel, of course, knew that the two terms of a relation would not be 
the same. But he looked for the identity of opposites - for 'immediate 
identities' - behind the differences. When the identity of opposites is 
combined with the other Hegelian principle of logic, the 'negation of the 
negation', we find the process of dialectical movement restoring an identity 
between things which appear different. Marx does not altogether abandon 
the level at which superficially, opposite things can appear to have an 
'essential' underlying similarity. But this is not the principal form of 
a Marxian relation. For Marx, two different terms or relations or movements 
or circuits remain specific and different: yet they form, with some equally 
distinct other term, relation, movement etc a 'complex unity': however, 
this is always a 'unity' formed by and requiring them to preserve their 
difference: a difference which does not disappear, which cannot be abolished 
by a simple movement of mind or a formal twist of the dialectic, which is 
not subsumed into some 'higher' but more 'essential', synthe^io involving 
the loss of concrete specificity. This latter type of 'non-'immediacy is 
what Marx calls a differentiated unity. Like the notion to which it is 
intimately linked - the notion of the concrete as the unity of "many 
determinations and relations" - the concept of a 'differentiated unity' is 
a methodological and theoretical key to this text, and to Marx's method
as a whole. It is difficult to spell out in the abstract how such a
\
procedure works in its specific application, though the Intro does begin 
to lay this cut for us. It means that, in the examination of any phenomenon 
or relation we must comprehend both its internal structure - what it is in 
its differentiatedness - as well as those other structures to which it is
coupled and with which it forms some larger, more inclusive structure.
Both the specificities and the connections - the complex unities of structures 
have to be demonstrated by the concrete analysis of concrete relations and 
conjunctions'. If relations are mutually articulated, but remain specified 
by their difference, this articulation, and the determinate conditions bn 
which it rests, has to be demonstrated. It cannot be conjured out of thin 
air according to some abstract, essentialist dialectical law. Differentiated 
unities are also therefore concrete: the concept regains the empirical moment 
as a privileged and undissolved 'moment' within a theoretical analysis 
without thereby making 'empiricist': the concrete analysis of concrete 
situations. Moreover, these relations are always determinate. Only 'under 
specific conditions', only 'in determinate conditions', can such unities be 
formed: each term of a relation depends on the fulfilment of 'certain 
conditions' for the unity to be sustained and to operate.
In the case before us, this deterrainacy Marx gives to production.
But why does production determine? There are several reasons particular 
to this case, but, for his final vindication of this part of the argument, 
he returns to the point which is fundamental to the whole exposition, and 
which he has used to differentiate his own type of complex unity from the 
'immediacy' of Hegelian essentialism: the possibility of break, of inter­
ruption, of the suspension of conditions which ruptures the unities: above 
all, to the fact that the processes take place irrevocably in historical 
time and under historical conditions. "The process always returns to 
production to begin anew". Further, determination by production is 
exercised, not only as the determinacy of production over all other moments 
of the process, separately, but in production's role as specifying "the 
different relations between different moments" (our italics). In short, 
in production's role in 'determining' the form of those combinations out 
of which complex unities are formed. This role of production as the 
principle of the formal articulations of a mode is crucial. In the 
Althusserean sense, production not only 'determines' in the last instance,
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but determines the form of the combination of forces and relations which
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make a mode of production a complex structure. Formally, production 
specifies the system of similarities and differences and the points of 
conjuncture between all the other instances of the mode, including which 
level is, at any moment of a conjuncture, "in dominance". This is the 
modal determinacy which production exercises in Marx’s overall sense. In 
•its more narrow and limited sense - as merely one moment, forming a 
’differentiated unity’ with others - production has its own spark, its 
own motive, its own ’determinateness' derived from other moments in the 
circuit (in this case, from consumption). To this argument - the nature 
of the relations of determinacy and complementarity or conjuncture between 
the different relations or levels of a mode of production - Marx returned 
at the end ox the Introduction. One of its results, already foreshadowed
here, is the 'law of uneven development'
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Marx now goes back to the beginning: to the method of Political economy. 
(P.100) In considering the political-economy of a country, where do we 
begin? One possible starting position is with "the real and concrete’’ 
given, observable, empirical concept, such as population. For production 
is inconceivable without a population which produces. This starting point, 
however, would be wrong. Population, like "production'' before is a 
deceptively transparent, natural, 'given* category, 'concrete' only in a
common sense way. Already it presupposes the division into classes,
• ♦  •
the division of labour, and thus wage-labour, capital, etc: the categories
of a specific mode of prod.uction. "Population" thus gives us only' 'a
chaotic conception of the whole". Further, it triggers off a methodological
procedure which moves from the blindingly obvious to "ever more simple 
concepts'*, "ever thinner abstractions". ’ This was the method of 
abstraction of the C17 economists. It is also the ''metaphysical'' method 
of Proudhon which Marx pilloried so brilliantly and brutally in t’he 
Poverty of Philosophy P. 118. Later economic theorists begin with simple 
relations and trace their way back to the concrete. This latter path,
Marx calls ''the obviously scientifically correct one". It is crucial 
to note, however, that this 'concrete' is concrete in a different sense 
from the first formulation. In the first case,jpcpulation'is 'concrete' 
in a simple, unilateral, 6ommon-sense way - it manifestly exists;:production 
cannot be conceived without it etc. etc. But the method which produces 
the^'complex concrete' is concrete in something closer to Hegel's sense: 
that is,it reveals or produces the concrete, not as a simple category, but 
as 'a rich totality of many determinations and relations'! The method 
then, is one which has to reproduce in thought (the active notion of a 
practice is certainly present here) the concrete-in-history. No men 
reflexive or copy theory of truth is now adequate. For example, such 
a method reconstructs the apparently general and simple category, 'population', 
as in fact contradictorily composed of the more concrete historical 
relations: slave-owner/slave, lord/serf, master/servant, capitalist/labourer. 
What is achieved by this methodjis, therefore, a theoretical clarification
of the categories: this clarification is a specific practice which theory 
is required to perform upon history, it constitutes the first part of theory 
"adequacy* to its objeetyThcught accomplishes such a clarification by 
decomposing simple, unified categories into the real, contradictory, 
antagonistic relations which compose them. It penetrates what*'is 
immediately present on the surface of b. society1', what*appears * as "the 
phenomenal form1' - the necessary form of the appearance of - a process 
which is taking place behind1' (p,255)«
Marx sums up the point. The concrete is concrete, in history, in 
social production, and thus in conception, not because it is simple and 
straighforward , but because it exhibits a certain kind of necessary 
complexity. As with Hegel, Marx makes a decisive distinction between 
the particular and the concrete: the notion that what is immediately given 
(particular) to our apprehension is also concrete, as against theory, 
which is abstract, may be true - and is currently living through a long 
revival: but it is not Marx. Thus, in order to 'think* this real, concrete 
historical complexity, we must reconstruct in the mind the determinations which 
constitute it. Thus, what is multiply determined, diversely unified, in 
history, already 'a result' appears, in thought, in theory, not as 'where 
we take off from' but as that which must be produced. Thus''the abstract 
determinations lead towards a reproduction of the concrete by way of 
thought'^ Let us note at once, that this makes the "way of thought' 
distinct from the logic of history as such, though it does not make thought 
''absolutely distinct1'. What is more, for Marx, the given concrete in 
history makes its appearance, once again, now as the historical substratum 
to thought; for, he asserts, though the concrete-in-history cannot be the point 
of departure for a theoretical demonstration, it is the absolute precondition 
for all theoretical construction: it iss ''the point of departure in reality 
and hence also (NOTE) the point of departure for observation and 
conception'1.
Marx's formulations here (P101) are really quite seminal; the more
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so since they have, in recent years, become the focus, the locus classicus, 
of the whole debate concerning Marx's epistemology. The "way of thought”, 
Marx seems to be arguing, must ''lay hold upon historical rea l i t y - 
vappropriate the concrete'1- and produce, by way of its own distinct 
practice, a theoretical construct adequate to its object (''reproduce it as 
the concrete in the mind"). It is important, however, to see that, right 
away, Marx addresses himself directly to the much-vexed question as to 
whe.ther this 'theoretical labour' can be conceived of as a practice which 
'•takes place entirely in thought”, (For Marx, p.^2), which 'is indeed its 
own criterion', and which ''has no need for verification from external 
practices to declare the knowledges they produce to be 'true'." (FM P 58)• 
For his remarks here are, once again, embedded in a critique of Hegel, 
a procedure which appears to warn us explicitly against any final, idealist 
bracketing* Because 'thought' has its own mode of appropriation, Marx 
argues, therefore Hegel made the error of thinking that l’the real" was the 
product of "thought concentrating itself, probing its own depths, and 
unfolding itself out of itself”. From this it was but an easy step to 
thinking of thought as absolutely (not relatively) autonomous, so that the 
movement of thought - v'the movement of the categories"- became' 'the real 
act of production". Of course, he continues, thought is thought and not 
another thing: it occurs in the head: it requires the process of mental 
representations and operations. But it does not, for that reason, 
'•generate itself". It is "a product of thinking and comprehending'i 
that is - and here we find Marx's most direct formulation of a 'theoretical 
practice' -''a product, rather, of the working-up of observation and 
conception into concepts.'* Any theory of 'theoretical practice', such 
as Althusser’s, which seeks to establish an "impassable threshold' 
between thought and its object, has to come to terms with the concrete 
reference (it is not, in our view, necessarily an empiricist reduction) 
which is embodied in Marx's clear and unambiguous notion, here, that 
thought proceeds from the ''working up of observation and conception”.
(Our italics). This product of theoretical labour, Marx observes now,
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is,*of course, a '•totality of thoughts n in the head* But it does not 
encompass or dissolve "the real subject1' - its object - v/hich < 'retains 
its autonomous existence outside the head1'# Indeed, Marx now caps the 
argument by briefly referring to the relation of thought to social being, 
a reference fully consonant with his position as previously stated in the 
Theses on Feuerbach# The object, M the real11 will always remain outside 
the head, so long as u the head's conduct is merely speculative, merely 
theoretical#1' That is, until the gap between thought and being is closed 
in practice# As he said,,vis-a-vis Feuerbachtv1Kan must prove the truth 
i#e the reality and power, the tliis-sidedness, of his thinking, in practice# 
The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking, that is isolated 
from practice is a purely scholastic question#1 * (Theses) there is no 
evidence for Marx having fundamentally broken with this notion that, 
though thinkitig "has its own way1', its "truth*1- its verification - can only 
rest in the "this-sidedness11 of thinking, in practice. In fact, the 
1857 text makes the point explicit: "Hence, in the theoretical method too,i 
the subject, society, must always be kept in mind as the presupposition11 
(P102) • On this question, then, bearing in mind the evidence of this 
passage, we must prefer Vilar's brief but succinct gloss over Althusser's 
complex but less satisfying ones: *'I admit that one ought neither to 
mistake thought for reality nor reality for thought, and that thought 
bears to reality only a 'relationship of knowledge', for what else could 
it do? Also that the process of knowledge takes place entirely within 
thought (where else on earth could it take place?) and that there exists 
an order and hierarchy of 'generalities' about which Althusser has had really 
major things to say. But on the other hand I fail to see what 'astounding' 
mistake Engels was committing when he wrote (in a letter, incidentally, 
as a casual image) that conceptual thought progressed 'asymptotically* 
towards the real. # . ' 1 (NLR 80)# As Vilar remarks, ‘'when reading the 1857 
Introduction, if one should ’hear its silence', one should also take 
care not to silence its words'* (KLR 80, *p.7*f-5).
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Thought, then, has its own distinct, relatively autonomous mode of 
appropriating ’the real’. It must "rise from the abstract to the concrete” 
not vice versa. This is different from '’the process by which the concrete 
itself comes into being”. The logic of theorizing, then, and the logic 
of history do not form an ’immediate identity’: they are mutually articulated 
,upon one another, but remain distinct within that unity. However, lest 
we immediately fall into the opposite error that, therefore thinking is its 
own thing, wholly outside or beyond social being, Marx, as we have seen, 
immediately turned, as if in the natural course of the argument, to the 
critique of Hegel, for whom of course, the march of the categories was 
precisely the main, the only motor. In so doing, Marx offered a critique 
of every other position which would transpose the distinctiveness of thought 
from reality (in terms of the modes of their production) into an ’absolute 
distinction’. His qualifications on this absolute break are pivotal. 
Thought always has built into it the concrete substratum of the manner 
in which the category has been realized historically within the specific 
mode of production being examined. In so far as a category already 
exists, albeit as a relatively simple relation of production, not yet 
with its ’’many sided connections”, then that category can already appear 
’in thought’, because categories are "the expression of relations”. If, 
then, turning to a mode in which that category appears in a more developed., 
many-sided form, we employ it again, but now to ’express’ a mere developed 
relation, then, in that sense, it does remain true that the development 
of the categories directly mirror the evolution of historic relations: the 
"path of abstract thought, rising from the simple to the combined”, does 
indeed "correspond to the real historical process”. In this limited case, 
the logical and historical categories are indeed parallel. The notion 
that Marx has prescribed that the logical and the historical categories 
never converge is shown to be incorrect. It is a matter of cases.
In other cases, however, the two movements are not identical in this 
way. And it is these instances which concern Marx, for this was 
precisely Hegel's error: for him, Marx says, thinking "became the real being”
in which therefore "the conceptual, worId as such is thus the only reality1'.
In short, Marx's critique of any attempt to construct 'thinking* as wholly 
autonomous is that this constitutes an idealist problematic., which ultimately 
derives the world from the movement of the Idea. No formalist reduction - 
whether of the Hegelian, positivist, empiricist or structuralist variety - 
escapes this stricture: the stricture which Althusser has finally been 
obliged to acknowledge as 'theoreticist' - empiricism's mirror-image. The 
distinctiveness of the mode of thought does not constitute it' as absolutely 
distinct from its object, the concrete-in-history: what it does is to pose, 
as a problem remaining to be resolved, precisely how thought, which is distinct, 
forms a unity with its object: remains, that is to say, nevertheless, determined 
'in the last instance' (and, Marx adds, in the 'first instance, too, since it 
is from 'society' that thinking derives its "presupposition"). The 
subsequent passages in the 1857 Intro, in fact constitute some of Marx's 
most cogent reflections on the dialectical relation of thought, of the 
'theoretical method', to the historical object of which it produces a knowledge: 
a knowledge, moreover, which - he insists- remains "merely speculative, 
merely theoretical" (there is no mistaking that 'merely') so long as^practice 
does not, dialectically, realize it - make it true.
What are the consequences, for method, of this remarks that the subject, 
'society' remains the presupposition of thought? If thought is distinct 
in its mode and path, yet articulated upon and presupposed by society, its 
object, how is this 'asymptotic' articulation to be achieved? Thought 
and its subject, society, are here conceived as neither identical nor: 
merely externally juxtaposed. But what, then, is the precise nature 
of their unity? If the genesis of the logical categories which express 
historical relations differ from the real genesis of those relations, 
what is the relation between them? How can the-.former be said, not 
merely reflect, express or approximate to the latter, but (more actively) 
to appropriate them? How does the mind reproduce the concreteness of 
the historical world in thought?
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The answer to these questions has something to do with the way history, 
.itself, so to speak, enters the 'relative autonomy* of thought: the manner 
in which the historical subject of thought is rethought inside Marx's mature 
work. The relation of thought to history is definitively not presented in 
the terms of a historical evolutionism, in which historical relations are 
explained in terms of their genetic origins, an external relation of 
'neighbourliness' is posited between any specific relation and its 'historical 
background': the 'development' of the relation is then conceived linearly, 
and traced through its branching variations: and the categories of thought 
faithfully and immediately mirror this genesis and its evolutionary paths.
This might sound like a caricature, until one recalls not only the 
evolutionary ways in which Marx's method have frequently been absorbed and 
subsumed within positivist historiography, but even the inert juxtaposing 
of like with like, and the faithful tracing cut of quite unspecified 'links' 
which has often done justice for modern instances of the Marxist method.
It is therefore as important to distinguish Marx from the evolutionism 
of a positivist historical method as it is, on the other side, to insist 
that he did not, either, conceive thought in terms of an absolute theoretical 
anti-historicism, in which -thought produces itself by what Althusser 
calls its own "knowledge-effects'*, its own "mechanisms", with no empirical 
or determinate reference whatsoever, and with an "absolute barrier'1 between 
the concept and the reality it represents and appropriates. V/e are dealing 
here, I believe, neither with a disguised variant of positivism, nor 
with a rigorous a-historicism, but with that most difficult of theoretical 
models, especially to the modern spirit: a distinct and quite specific 
historical epistemolgy.
In the course of what follows Marx employs the distinction? he has 
previously established between different types of 'relation': immediate, 
mediated, etc. Previously, these had been applied to the content 
of a theoretical analysis - to 'production', 'distribution', 'exchange'.
These distinctions are now applied again, this time at a meta-level: they 
now refer to the different types of relations which exist between thought
and history ■*zma
■ '3|jg|
He proceeds by example. In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel begins with*®
' i W«M
the category, ’possessionPossession is a simple relation which, however,HI
• • o it
like 'production*, cannot exist without more concrete relations - i.e. ’.|S;
‘■MM
historical groups with possess. Groups can, however, ’possess’ without
. ’M R
their possessions being ’private property1 in the modern sense. But since
m
the historico—judicial relation, ’possession’, does exist albeit in a simple fd
form, we can think it. The simple relation is the ^concrete substratum" *
i 'i
of our (relatively simple) concept of it. Marx seems to argue here that ■
if a concept is, historically, relatively undeveloped (simple) our concept
(of it) will be rather abstract. At this level, a connection of a
fairly reflexive kind does exist between the level of historical development
of the relation and the relative concreteness of the category which expresses
or appropriates it.
But now Marx complicates the Theory/History couplet. Historically 
the development of the relation is not evolutionary. No straight, unbroken 
path exists from simple to more complex development, either in thought or 
history. It is possible for a relation to move from a dominant to a 
subordinate position within a mode of production as a .whole. And this 
question of dominant/subordinate is not 'identical* with the previous 
question in terms of simple/more developed, or abstract/concrete. By 
referring, the relation to its articulation with a mode of production (which 
necessarily consists of different relations and levels), Marx indicates 
the crucial shift from a progressive or sequential or evolutionary 
historicism to what we might call * the history of epochs and modes *: a 
structural history. This movement towards the concept of mode and epoch, 
which interrupts the linear movement of an evolutionary progression, 
and reorganizes our conception of historical time in terms of the 
succession of modes of production, defined by the internal relations of 
dominance and subordination which exists between the different relations
which constitute a mode, is a crucial step. There is, of course, nothing
... • • .. . . . . . .
original whatever in drawing attention to the fact that Marx divided history**
in terms of successive modes of production: ‘’every child knows..'4 Yet 
the consequences of this break with evolutionism for Marx's epistemology 
and method does not appear to have been fully registered. The concepts,
'mode of production' and 'social formation' are often employed as if they 
are in fact, simply large-scale historical generalizations, within which 
smaller chronological sections of historical time can be neatly redistributed. 
In the same way, the notion of breaks and transitions between modes, or the 
notion of the ancient modes which survive,,in transformed ways, within modes 
of production which succeed them, has been, if not repressed, then smoothed 
out in the course of what often takes the form of a false empirical 
thoroughness. Yet, clearly, with the concepts of 'mode of production’ and 
'social formation', Marx drav;s our attention to structural interconnections 
which cut into and break up the smooth march of a historical evolutionism.
It represents a rupture wdLth historicisn in its simple, dominant form, 
though it is not, in our view, a break with the historical as such.
Take money. It exists before banks, before capital. If we use the 
term, 'money', to refer to this relatively simple relation, we use a concept 
which (like 'possession' above) is still abstract and simple: less concrete 
than the concept of 'money' under commodity production. As 'money' 
becomes more developed, so our concept of it will tend to become more 
'concrete'. However, it is possible for 'money', in its simple form to 
have a dominant position in a mode of production. It is also possible 
to conceive of 'money', in a more developed, many-sided form, and thus 
expressed by a more concrete category, occupying a subordinate position 
in a mode of production.
In this double-fitting procedure, the couplets simple/developed, or 
abstract/concrete refer to what we might call the diachronic string, the 
developmental axis. The couplet dominant/subordinate point to the 
synchronic axis - the position in which a given category or relation 
stands in terms of the other relations with which it is articulated in 
a specific mode of production. These latter relations are always thought 
by Marx in terms of relations of dominance and subordination. The
characteristic modern inflexion is to transfer our attention from the first 
axis to the second, thus asserting Marx's latent structuralism. The 
difficulty is, however, that the latter does not bring the former movement to 
a halt, but delays or displaces it. In fact, the line of historical 
development is always constituted within or behind the structural articulation. 
The crux of this 'practical epistemology', then, lies precisely in our 
ability to think of the simple/develoned axis and the dominant/subordinate 
axis as dialectically related. This is indeed how Marx defined his own 
method by proxy, in the 2nd Afterword to Capital: "What else is he picturing 
but the dialectic method"?
Take another case. Peru was relatively developed, but had no 'money'.
In the Roman Empire, 'money' existed, but was 'subordinate': to other 
payment relations, e.g. taxes, payments-in-kind. Money only makes a 
historic appearance "in its full intensity" in bourgeois society. There 
is thus no linear progression of this relation and the category which 
expresses it through ea.ch succeeding historical stage. Money does not 
"wade its way through each historical stage’1. It may appear, or not 
appear, in different modes: be developed or simple: dominant or subordinate. 
What matters is not the mere appearance of the relation sequentially through 
time, but its position within the configuration of productive relations 
which make each mode an ensemble. Modes of production thus form the 
discontinuous structural sets through which history articulates itself.
History moves - but only as a delayed movement, through a series of 
social formations or ensembles: by means of a series of breaks, engendered 
by the internal contradictions specific to each mode. The theoretical 
method, then, to he adequate to its subject, society, must ground itself 
in the specific arrangement of historical relations in the successive 
modes of production, not takes its position on the site of a simple, 
linearly-constructed sequential history.
One more example: Labour. (P103-5)• Labour is a simple and ancient 
category. It has been subject to a distinct theoretical evolution, from
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the Physiocras, who identified one kind of labour - agriculture - as the 
source of wealth, to Adam Smith, who identified labour-in-general as the 
source of wealth. Was this development the product of a theoretical practice 
only, "wholly within thought?" Only in the limited sense that we cannot 
think with coins, only with the mental representation of the money-relation. 
Adam Smith says ■labcur-in-general5. Since this is, in common-sense terms, 
more ’generalised1 a concept, than labour-ac-agriculture, is it also 
therefore more abstract? Paradoxically, not at ail. ’Labour-in-general' 
expresses a much more concrete set of historical relations than the 
apparently concrete Physiocratic notion of ’agricultural labour'. For what 
makes labour ’under bourgeois society the extraordinarily productive power 
it is, is the fact that labour has been generalised, not in the head but in 
fact historically. "Individuals can with ease transfer from one labour to 
another" - ’indifferently'• "Not only the category, labour, but labour in 
reality has here become the means of creating wealth in general and has 
ceased to be organically linked with particular individuals in any specific 
form". (P1C4). It is indeed money end the dominant wages-ferm which has 
•mediated’ the passage of labour under and into this domain of general 
equivalence. Karx regards this as cue of the essential1, determinant 
conditions for bourgeois society - theapps-veanco of ’free labour' in the 
market, and the mediation of money as the * generalize:?', the form of 
equivalence, between different types of labour. (As Lenin succinctly 
paraphrased it, "the production ox comr.iOd5.tics is a system of social 
relationships in which different producers produce various products (the 
social division of labour), and in which all these products are balanced 
off against one anceher in exchange. Consequently, the element common 
to all the commodities is not concrete labour in a definite branch of 
production, but abstract human labour - human labour in general".
From "Marxism" in Karl Marx, Man, Thinker and Revolutionist, ed. D. Byazanoff 
Martin Laurence, 1927. Now Marx delivers the articulation of thought 
and history as he conceives it. The "most general abstractions" - in the
real sense of 'general5 (i.e. many-sided developed) - appear only when
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there is, in society, in history, •‘the richest possible concrete developments. 
Once this has happened "in reality", the relation "ceases to be thinkable in 
its particular (i.e abstract) form alone." Labour - as a loose,catch-all, 
concept*indicating something as weak a concept as'all societies must labour 
to reproduce' has thus been replaced by the category, 'labcur-in-general', 
which is a more concrete category 5 but only because the latter category now 
refers to a real, concrete, more many-sided, historical appearance. The 
'general concept' has, Marx now staggeringly asserts, "become true in 
practice'. It has achieved that specificity, 'in thought', which makes 
it capable of appropriating the concrete relations of labour in practice.
It has "achieved practical truth as an abstraction only as a category of 
the most modern society". Thus, he says, "even the most abstract categories., 
are nevertheless..themselves • likewise a product of historical relations 
and possess their full validity only for and within these relations". (P105)
It is for this reason especially that bourgeois society, "the most 
developed and the most complex historic organization of productiori', allows 
us insights into vanished social formations: provided we do not make over- 
hasty 'identities' or:temudge over all historical differences". The 
argument here is a sophisticated one. For, in so far as older modes 
of production survive within, or reappear in modified form within, 
capitalism, the "anatomy" of the latter can provide "a key" to the anatomy 
of previous social formations. Contrary to some interpretations, however, 
this part of the argument asserts, not contradicts,the centrality of the 
diachronic, historical, developmental aspect. For, Marx adds, not in 
a simple, linear* sense, smudging over all historical differences: nor 
ideologically, as is true of the Political Economists, who read bourgeois 
relations backwards as the only, natural, pre-given end of all historical 
development. In short, we must 'think' the relation between the 
categories of bourgeois social formations and those of previous, vanished 
formations, not as an ’• immediate identity* ('teut one must not identify 
them"): one must think that relation in ways which preserve what is 
specific - and contradictory - to bourgeois society Ci.e the relations of
developed/Bimple or of dominant/subordinate in which new and previous inodes 
of production are arranged or combined within bourgeois society). 'For 
production to go on at ail they (the factors of production) must unite.
The specific manner in which this union is accomplished distinguishes the 
different epochs of the structure of society from one another.’ (CapII p.36-7) 
One must therefore think 'a relation' in ways which preserve differences, 
distinctions, specificities - that is, "always with an essential difference". 
From this basis, Marx can make his critique of simple, historical evolutionism
1
"The so-called historical presentation of development is founded, as a 
rule, on the fact that the latest form regards the previous ones as steps:- 
leading up to itself.." This is to regard the matter "one-sidedly".
This does not however, abolish 'history' from the scheme. If thought 
is grounded in social being, then it must be present social reality - modern 
bourgeois society, "the most developed and complex historic organization 
of production" - which forms thought's presupposition, its 'point of 
departure'. That is, the object of economic theorizing, "modern bourgeois 
society", is "always what is given in the head as well as in reality": 
the succession of the economic categories in any "historical, social science" 
thus "express the forms of being, the characteristics of existence, and 
often only individual sides of this specific society, this subject". And 
it is this point - which "holds for science as well" - which is "decisive 
for the order and sequence of the categories". I have gone through this 
argument in what ma y  seem wearisome detail, because it has recently been 
argued - by the Althussereans especially - that, with this observation abqut 
the distinction between the historical and the logical succession of the 
theoretical categories, Marx makes his final rupture with historicism. 11; 
is usually forgotten that this point is made by Marx in the context of a 
discussion about the fundamentally relativised epistemological origins 
of thought itself: a discussion which specifically draws attention to 
the dependence of the logical categories on the relations, the "forms of 
being", which they "express". Thus, not what thought produces by its 
own 'mechanisms' from within itself, but what is concretely "given in the
head as well as reality” is Marx's starting-point here for his discursus 
on method.
"The order and sequence of the economic categories", then, do not 
"follow one another in the sequence in which they were historically decisive": 
but not because - as was true for Hegel - the logical categories engender 
themselves above or outside the "real relations", but because the 
epistemological reference for thought is not the past but the present 
historic organization of production. This is a quite different argument.
Thus, what matters for Marx is not the historical sequence of the categories 
but "their order within bourgeois society". What is more within bourgeois 
society, each category does not exist as a discrete entity, whose separate 
historical development can be traced, but within a 'set', a mode - arranged 
in relations of dominance and subordination, of determination, and 
determinateness to other categories: an ensemble of relation. This 
notion of what, in structuralist language, is sometimes called a 
•combination', or a combinatoire, does indeed interrupt - break with - any 
straight historical evolutionism. The argument has then, sometimes, 
been taken as supporting Marx's final break with 'history' as such: a 
break expressed in the couplet, historicism science, and providing the basis 
of a fully theoretical, or the potential for a 'fully theoreticised' 
a-historicism. Marx, in my view, is drawing a different distinction, signalling 
a different 'break': that between a sequential historical evolutionism 
determining thought/and the determinateness of thought within the present historic 
organization of social formations. All the relations of production of a social 
formation'appear in it articulated as an ensemble: this is what constitutes 
it as a mode. There are complex internal relations and connexions between 
them. In each mode, moreover, there is a level of determination 'in the 
last instance': one specific production-relation which "predominates over 
the rest..assigns rank and influence to the others... bathes all other 
colours and modifies their particularity." Marx's method insists that 
we attend to the specificity of each ensemble, and to the relations of 
determination, dominance and subordination which each epoch establishes
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between its relations. This points towards the Althusserean concept of 
a social formation as a "complexly structured whole", "structured in 
dominance" and to the complementary notions of 'over-determination' and 
'conjuncture'. The full theoretical implications of this modal conception 
takes Marx a good deal of the way towards what we may call a 'structural 
historicism*. But, since thought, too, takes its origins from this 
'reality', which is "always given in the head", it too operates by way 
of an epistemology determined in the first-last instance by the "present 
historical organization of production".
This is the argument which Marx now develops, again by way of examples.
In bourgeois society, "agriculture is progressively dominated by capital".
What matters for the order and sequence of categories is not the evolution
of any one relation - say, feudal property - into industrial capital:
though, in Capital, Marx does at certain points provide just such a historical
sketch. Still, what matters is the relational position of industrial
capital and landed property, or of 'capital' and 'rent', in the capitalist
mode as against their relational position in say, the feudal mode. In
Marx's view, it is the latter which provides the starting-point of all
theorizing. This is 1 anti-historicist' if by that term we mean that the
method does not rest with the tracing of the historical development of each
relation, singly and sequentially, through time. But it is profoundly
historical once we recognize that the starting-point - bourgeois society -
is not outside history, but rather "the present historic organization of
society". Bourgeois society is what 'history' has delivered to the
present as its 'result'. The bourgeois ensemble of relations is the
present-as-history. History, we may say, realises itself progressively.
Theory, however, appropriates history 'regressively'. (We must add that
for Marx, this regressive, retrospective grasp by theory of practice can
itself only be provisional, since the 'knowledge' of objective social
tendencies which theory so 'reproduces' is not complete until it forms
the basis of a conscious class practice which 'produces' the future
in historical action). Theory, then, starts from history as a developed
i
result. This is its presupposition, in the head. In short, history, 
not in a simple sequential treaty, but in its realization as a 'complexly 
structured totality', a mode of production, articulates itself also as the 
epistemological premise, the starting point, of a theoretical labour.
And this is what I want to call Marx's historical - not ,'historicist' - 
epistemology: one which, however, undeveloped and un-theoreticised, marks 
off Marx's method sharply both from a philosophically unreflexive empiricism, 
and from the whole 'philosophy of science' in its traditional modes, 
including that final reference to the self-generating 'scientificity' of 
science which sometimes marks the lingering positivist trace within 
structuralism itself. Colletti (from whom, in other respects I differ) 
has expressed the argument succinctly when he observes that much theoretical 
Marxism has shown a tendency "to mistake the 'first in time' - i.e. that 
from which the logical process departs as a recapitulation of the historical 
antecendents - with the 'first in reality' or the actual foundation of the 
analysis. The consequence has been that whereas Marx's logico-historical 
reflections culminate in the formation of the crucial problem of the 
contemporaneity of history (as Lukacs once aptly said, 'the present as 
history') traditional Marxism has always moved in the opposite direction 
of a philosophy of history which derives its explanation of the present 
from 'the beginning of time'." (Marxism and Hegel, P130-1).
Marx's 'historical epistemology', then, maps the mutual articulation 
of historical movement and theoretical reflection, not as a simple identity, 
but as differentiations within a unity. But he retains - in, as it were 
a displaced form - the historical premise, thoroughly reconstructed, 
inside the epistemological procedure and method as its final determination. 
This is not thought and reality on infinitely parallel lines with "an 
impassable threshold" between them. It signifies a convergence - as 
Engels said, an asymptotic movement - on the ground of the given: here 
bourgeois society as the ground or object both of theory and practice.
And it remains an 'open' epistemology, not a self-generating or self- 
sufficient one, because its 'scientificity' is guaranteed only by that
'fit' between thought and reality - each in its own mode - which produces 
a knowledge which 'appropriates' reality in the only way that it can (in 
the head): and yet delivers a critical method capable of penetrating behind 
the phenomenal forms of society to the hidden movements, the deep-structure 
core, the "real relations" which lie behind them. This 'scientific' 
appropriation of the laws and tendencies of the structure of a social 
formation is then also the law and tendency of its "passing away": the 
possibility, not of the proof, but of the realization of knowledge in
t
practice, in its practical resolution - and thus, the self-conscious overthrow 
of those relations in a class struggle which moves along the axis of society's 
contradictory tendencies, and which is something more than "merely 
speculative", more than a theoretical speculation. Here, as Colletti 
has remarked, we are no longer dealing with "the relationship 'thought-being' 
within thought, but rather with the relation between thought and reality". 
(M&H, 13*0.
I believe the 1837 Introduction has forced upon us a quite new and
radical notion of 'the historical', especially in its relation to Marx's
theory and method. The reconceptualization thus put in train has
consequences, not only for Marx's 'epistemology' but for his theory of
historical formations itself historical materialism. This is a complex
question which we can only lightly pencil in here. But it is worth while
briefly referring this methodological argument in the Intro to a passage
such as that which begins on P^59 of the Grundrisse itself (Notebook IV),
where the same considerations are applied, now to the distinctions between
the 'historical origins' of the capitalist mode, and capitalism as 'the
present historic organization of production' - a distinction which points
back to what I have called Marx's 'structural historicism.' The
capitalist mode, Marx is arguing, depends on the transformation of money
0.
into capital. Thus, money constitutes one of "the antideluvian conditions 
of capital, belongs to its historic presuppositions". But once this trans­
formation to its modern form in commodity production is accomplished - we 
may call it the establishment of the capitalists mode of production proper -
-  ^9 -
capitalism no longer depends directly upon this recapitulation of its 
'historic presupposition" for its continuation. These presuppositions 
are now "past and gone?' - they belong to " the history of its formation, 
but in no way to its contemporary history, i.e. not to the real system 
of the mode of production ruled by ii?' . In short, the historical conditions 
for the appearance of a mode of production disappear into its results, and 
are reorganized by this realization: capitalism now posits "in accordance 
with its immanent essence, the conditions which form its point of departure 
in production" - ’’posits the- conditions for its realization", "on the 
basis of its own reality". (Quotes, P^59) It/capitalisrynno longer proceeds 
from presuppositions in order to become, but rather it is itself presupposed, 
and proceeds from itself tc create the conditions of its maintenance and 
growth" (VkSG). This argument is then linked by Marx, with the error of 
Political Economy, which mistakes the past conditions for capitalism 
becoming what it is, with the present conditions under which the capitalism 
is organized and appropriates: an error which Marx relates tc Political 
Economy's tendency to treat the harmonious laws of capitalism as natural and 
t» general".
Passages like these in the Grnndrisse are by no means the only place 
in Marx's mature work where this distinction between the historic pre­
conditions for capitalism, and the fully constituted capitalist mode is 
drawn. This theme forms a major part of the first volume of Capital, 
especially the sections devoted to " The General Law Of Capitalist Accumulation ”. 
Here, Marx distinguishes the processes of " primitive accunulatiorf'
(severance of the worker from the means of production, driving of 
peasants off the land, enclosure, the system of colonies and national
i ‘ . ,
debt, etc.) from the more advanced and developed forms of capitalist 
accumulation (centralization of capital, "purposive application of 
science"to the improvement of technique, socialized forms of labour, 
changes in the organic composition of capital, leading to monopoly, a 
falling rate of profit and crises, etc). (Cf: the magnificently sustained 
argument on these points in the 2pth Chapter of Capital l). Marx himself
-  50 -
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summed it up: "As soon as this process of transformation has sufficiently 
disintegrated the old society, has decomposed it through and through... then 
the further socialization of labour and the further transformation of land 
and of the other means of production...takes on a new form." (Capital I 
P762). In the face of the evidence from Capital itself, it surely cannot 
be seriously maintained for long that, with his brief remarks on the 
"succession of the categories" in the 18^7 Intro., Marx wholly relinquishes 
forever the 'historical' method for the essentially synchronic, structuralist 
one. What seems mere accurate is to say that, in his method, Marx clearly 
distinguishes the diachronic, developmental axis of his analysis (marked 
especially in those extensive parts of Capital where he is unrepentantly 
concerned, precisely, with the most delicate reconstruction of the genesis 
of certain key categories and relations of bourgeois society) from the 
'anatomical' analysis of the structure of the capitalist mode (where the 
"present historic organization of production" is treated, analytically and 
theoretically, as exhibiting its own laws, tendencies and forms, that is, 
as an on-going 'structure of production', or as a combination of productive 
modes.) The distinction between these two, different, but inter-related 
modes of analysing capitalism (in terms of its genesis, and of what that 
Genesis has delivered to us as a 'complexly-structured' result), is crucial. 
The requirement laid on his readers is to maintain these two modes of 
theoretical analysis at once - a view eloquently expressed in the Afterword 
to Capital 1. 'This injunction constitutes both the comprehensiveness, 
and the difficulty, of his dialectical method. But the temptation to bury 
one side of the method in favour of the other - whether the historical at 
the expense of the structural, or vice versa - is, at best, an evasion of 
the theoretical difficulty Marx's own work proposes: an evasion for which 
there is no warrant, either in this part of the 1857 Intro., or in the 
four volumes of Capital (which clearly employ both modes selectively) or in 
the substantive evidence provided by looking at Marx's mature work, with 
its relative weights and apportionment of methods, as "an artistic whole". 
("Then there is still the fourth book to write - the historico-literary one.
-  52 -
This is relatively the easiest for me as all the problems arc solved in the 
first three books and thus this last one is more of a repetitive in 
historical form. But I cannot make up my mind to send anything off until 
I have the whole thing in front of me. Whatever shortcomings they may 
have, my v;ritings do have this advantage that they are an artistic whole 
and that is only attainable through my habit of not letting them be printed 
until they lie before me complete". M to Engels, July 1865* Q in 
McLellan P338, MEW XXXI P132). As Hobsbawm has remarked, "a structural 
model envisaging only the maintenance of a system is inadequate. It is 
the simultaneous existence of stabilizing and disruptive elements which 
such a model must reflect.. Such a dual (dialectical) model is difficult 
to set up and use, for in practice the temptation is great to operate it, 
according to taste or occasion, either as a stable functionalism or as 
one of revolutionary change; whereas the interesting thing about it is, 
that it: is both". (E.Hobsbawm, "K.Marx's Contribution to Historiography", 
in Ideology In Soc. Science, ed. E. Blackburn, P280.)
i
53
IV
The problem touched, on here goes to the heart of the ’problem of 
method', not only of the 1857 Intro, but of Capital itself: a question 
which the Intro throws light on but does not resolve, and which we can
A.
,pursue only a little way further at this stage in the argument.
In his persuasive attempt to present Marx as a structuralist in the 
Levi-Strauss sense, Godelier, for example, points to ’’the priority of the 
study of structures over that of genesis and evolution": a claim, he 
suggests, inscribed in the very architecture of Capital itself. ("Structure 
& Contradiction In Capital", in Blackburns Ideology in Social Science: 
more fully developed in Rationality & Irrationality in Economics, NLB.) 
Certainly, the main emphasis in Capital falls on the systematic analysis 
of. the capitalist mode of production, not on a comprehensive reconstruction 
of the genesis of bourgeois society as a social formation: an 'anatomical* 
study, made via the sustained critique of the categories of Political 
Economy not a reconstructed history: thus, the long section on'Ground Pent", 
which forms Part IV of Capital III, opens with the remark: "The analysis 
of landed property in its various historical forms belongs outside of the 
limits of this work ... We assume then that agriculture is dominated by 
thp capitalist mode of production .." (Cap III P.?20 ). This does
not contradict the centrality of those many passages which are in fact 
directly historical or genetic in form (including parts of this same 
section of Capital III). Indeed, there are important distinctions between 
different kinds of 'historical' writing here: much that seems 'historical' 
to us now was, of course, for Marx immediate and contemporary - quotations 
from Parliamentary speeches, Factory Inspector's Reports, from the Economist 
the chapter on "The Working Day", in Capital I, on the other hand, contains 
a graphic historical sketch, which also supports a theoretical argument - 
the analysis of the forms of industrial labour under capitalism, and the 
system's ability, first, to extend the working day, and then, as labour 
becomes organized, the movement towards its limitation ("the outcome of a
protracted civil war .."). Both are different from "the task of tracing 
the genesis of the money-form .. from its simplest .. to dazzling money- 
form", announced early in the same volume ■ (P.^ f8): a genesis which Marx 
argues ’’shall, at the same time, solve the riddle presented by money", 
but which in fact is not cast in the form of a ’history of money' as such 
in any connected, sequential way, but an analysis of "the form of value" 
as expressed in the money-form (our italics), a quite different matter. 
(Godelier rightly calls this last example "the ideal genesis of economic 
categories". (Capital ^7-8: Godelier 3^8 in Blackburn). And all of these 
differ again, from the substantial historical material in Parts VII and 
VIII of Capital I, which is addressed explicitly to the question of 'origins’ 
but which Marx deliberately put after, not before, the basic theoretical 
exposition. None of these qualifications should be taken as modifying our 
appreciation of the profoundly historical imagination which informs Capital 
throughout. Decisively, the systematic form of the work (especially 
volume 2), never undercuts the fundamental historical premise which frames 
the whole exposition, and on which Marx's claim for its 'scientificity', 
paradoxically, rests: the histcrically-specific, hence transitory, nature 
of the capitalist epoch and the categories which express it. As early as 
I8*f6 he had written to Annenkov, a propos Proudhon: "He has not perceived 
that economic categories are only abstract expressions of these actual 
relations and only remain true while these relations exist. He therefore 
falls into the error of the bourgeois' economists, who regard these economic 
categories as eternal and not as historical laws which are only laws for a 
particular historical development, for a definite development of the 
productive forces". (Pov of Phil, volume, P 209). He never changed his 
mind. (Thus, when in 1873* his reviewer in The European Messenger 
precised him to this effect, he quoted him without dissent: "On the 
contrary, in his ^~Marx's_7 opinion every historical period has laws of 
its own ..As soon as society has outlived a given period of development, 
and is passing over from one given stage to anotherj it begins to be
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subject also to other laws." Afterword to 2nd German Edition of Capital, 
Capital I,' P 18). Thus, even if we allow Godelier's observation - "the 
genesis of a structure can only be studied under the •guidance' of a pre­
existing knowledge of that structure" - as a provisional formulation which 
squares with that taken by Marx in the 18^7 Intro, the matter cannot rest 
there. It is certainly the case that, in extenso, the volumes of Capital 
deal with the forms and relations which the capitalist system requires to 
reproduce itself on an expanded scale: that is, it deals with the 'structure 
and its variations', including its reproduction of the principal condition 
of its own continuing functioning: the recreation of the basic elements, 
'capital' and 'labour'. Some of the most dazzling parts of the manuscript 
consist, precisely, of the 'laying bare' of the forms of the circuits of 
capital which enable this "metamorphosis" to take place. But it would be 
drastically to simplify Marx's method in Capital to treat his analysis as 
consisting, essentially, of a structural-functionalist exposition of 
capitalism. There are already two, discontinuous levels already at work 
here: the 'real relations' which sustain the reproductive processes of 
capitalism, and the 'phenomenal forms' in which they appear, in the 
consciousness of the 'bearers' of the system, in the juridical and 
philosophic concepts which mediate its movements, and even, sometimes, in 
the so-called theory (vulgar Political Economy). Already, then, a 
critical science was required to unmask the inverted forms of the meta­
morphosis of capital, and lay bare its real relations. The difficult 
opening sections on Commodity-Fetishism not only lay the base, substantially, 
in nucleus, for the rest of the exposition; they also stand as a dramatic 
demonstration of this method. Thus, though for Marx one of the truly 
staggering aspects of capitalsim was, exactly, its capacity to appear as 
a self-sustaining, self-producing, self-regulating system, he still 
required that this mediation via the "forms of the appearance" of its 
operation had to be read - that is, read through, read behind, read back 
to their presuppositions - as if one were "decyphering the hieroglyphic,
to get behind the secret of our own social products” . And one of the 
sources of the permanent, self-producing quality of capitalism to-which 
Marx drew our attention in this particular respect was, precisely, the 
•loss' (mis-recognition) of any sense of them as socially-created, 
historically produced forms: "Han's reflections on the forms of social 
life, and consequently also his scientific analysis of these forms, take 
a course directly opposite to that of their actual historical development.
He begins post festum with the results of the process of development 
already to hand. The characters that stamp products as commodities, and 
whose establishment is a necessary preliminary to the circulation of 
commodities, have already acquired the stability of natural, self- 
understood forms of social life before man seeks to decipher, not their 
historical character, for in his eyes they are immutable, but their 
meaning”. (Capital I, P 7^-5)* "So too”, he added, "the economic categories, 
already discussed by us, bear the stamp of history” (Cap. I, P 169). They 
are "socially valid and, therefore, objective thought-forms which apply to 
the production-relations peculiar to this one historically determined mode 
of social production" (Cap I, P k2) (Cf: also Engels' letter to Lange,
29.3»65 in Correspondency P 198). But, this decypherment - which is, in 
its "practical state”, his method ("all science would be superfluous if 
the outward appearance and the essence of things directly coincided”: Capital 
III, P 797) - is not just a critique: it is a critique of a certain 
distinctive kind - that which not only lays bare the 'real relations' 
behind their 'phenomenal forms', but does so in a way which also reveals 
as contradictory and antagonistic v/hat, on the surface of the system, 
appears only as functional to its self-expansion. This is the case with 
each of the central categories with which Marx deals: commodity, labour, 
wages, prices, the equivalence of exchange, the organic composition of 
capital, etc. In this way, Marx combines an analysis which strips off 
the 'appearances' of how capitalism works, discovers their "hidden substratum, 
and is thus able to reveal how it really works: with an analysis which, at
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the same time, reveals why this functionalsim in depth is also the source 
of its own '’negation" ("with the inexorability of a law of Nature": Capital 
I, P 763)• The first level is the ideological level, at which the "phenomenal 
forms" arc taken at their justificatory face-value: they "appear directly 
and spontaneously as current modes of thought". The second penetrates to 
"the essential relation manifested within", to "their hidden substratum": 
they "must first be discovered by science". Classical Political Economy 
provides the basis - but by a critique - of this second, scientific level, 
since it "nearly touches the true relation of things, without however 
consciously formulating it". Marx's critique, however, transcends its origins 
in Political Economy, not because it formulates consciously what has been 
left unsaid, but because it reveals the antagonistic movement concealed behind 
its "automatic mode", its "spontaneous generation" (Capital I, P 5^2). The 
analysis of the double form of the commodity - use-value, exchange-value - 
with which Capital opens, and which appears at first as merely a formal 
exposition, only delivers its first substantive conclusion when, in the 
Chapter on "The General Formula for Capital", the 'circuit of equivalence' 
(M-C-M) is redefined as a circuit of exploitation (M-C-M'), where "This 
increment or excess over the original value I call 'surplus value' ". "It 
is this movement that converts it into capital" (P 150). He
concluded the following chapter on "Contradictions in the Formula of 
Capital", thus: "Our friend, Moneybags... must buy his commodities at 
their value, and yet at the end of the process must withdraw more value 
from circulation than he threw into it at starting. His development into 
a full-grown capitalist must take place both within the sphere of circulation 
and without it. These are the conditions of the problem." (P 166). Thus, 
as Nicolaus has argued, "Exploitation proceeds behind the back of the 
exchange process .. production consists of an act of exchange, and, 
on the other hand, it consists of an act which is the opposite of 
exchange.. the exchange of equivalents is the fundamental social relation 
of production, yet the extraction of non-equivalents is the fundamental 
force of production" (Blackburn ylk-5)• To present Marx as if he is the
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theorist, solely, of the operation of 'a structure and its variations',
• ms ' ' , •
and not, also and simultaneously, the theorist of its limit, interruption 
and transcendence is to transpose a dialectical analysis into a structural- 
functionalist one, in the interest of an altogether abstract scientism.
Marx's most mature reflection on his own method comes to us, unfortunately, 
largely by way of a quotation from someone else (we have already quoted his 
Russian reviewer in the long extract and translation Marx included in his 
2nd Afterword); it is a defence he accepted without reservation. Certainly, 
the fundamentally structuralist cast of his imagination - all that is summed 
up in Marx's use of the terms forms, functions, circuits, epochs, modes, etc. - 
is not to be doubted in this passage: but neither is the reconstitution of 
the diachronic through the analysis of synchronic variation: "The one thing 
which is of moment to Marx is to find the law of the phenomena .. in so far 
as they have a definite form and mutual connexion within a given historical 
period. Of still greater moment to him is the law of their variation, of 
their development, i.e. of their transition from one form into another, 
from one series of connexions into a different one... The scientific value 
of such an inquiry lies in the disclosing of the special laws which regulate 
the origin, existence, development, death of a given social organism and 
its replacement by another and higher one." (Cap I, P 18-19).
Godelier is aware that an analysis of the variations of a structure 
which Eire compatible with the reproduction of its constant functions is not 
a theory of change: and hence that Marx's 'structure' must embrace the 
notion of contradiction. But the functionalist shadow continues to haunt 
his treatment of this aspect. Thus, for Godelier, there Eire two, fundamental 
contradictions in Marx's analysis of the system: that between capital and 
labour (a contradiction within the structure of the 'social relations of 
production') and that between the socialized nature of labour under large- 
scale industry and the productive forces of capital (a contradiction between 
structures). Characteristically, Godelier exsilts the latter (deriving from 
the "objective properties" of the system) over the former (the struggle
i
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between the classes). Characteristically, (as the argument of, say, the 
Chapter on "The Historical Tendency of Capitalist Accumulation" in 
Capit'al I makes clear), Marx intended to connect the two: to found the 
self-conscious practice of class struggle in the objective contradictory 
tendencies of the system. The two strands are indeed beautiftally and 
inextricably connected in passages such as the following (Capital I P 763) 1 
the establishment of the capitalist mode "on its own feet";"then the further 
socialization of labour"; the centralization of capital, combined with the 
development of the "cooperative form of the labour process", the. "conscious 
technical application of science" and "the entanglement of all peoples in 
the net of the world market"; finally, "the constantly diminishing number 
of the magnates of capital" and "a class always increasing in number, and 
disciplined, united, organized by the very mechanism of the process of 
capitalist production itself ...The monopoly of capital becomes a fetter 
upon the mode of production... they become incompatible with their 
capitalist integument...Their integument is burst asunder.." The neat, 
binary contrast between a 'scientific' contradiction which is objective 
material and systemic, and the practice of class struggle which is 
epiphenomenal and teleological disappears in the face of this essential 
internal connectedness of theory to practice. Korsch long ago, and 
correctly, identified the attempt "to degrade the opposition betv/een the 
social classes to a temporary appearance of the underlying contradiction 
between the productive forces and production-relations" as 'Hegelian'.
(Karl Marx, P 201). We must suppose Marx knew what he was doing when, in 
his letter outlining the argument of volume 3> he ended: "Finally, since 
these three (wages, ground rent, profit) constitute the respective sources 
of income of the three classes...we have, in conclusion, the class struggle, 
into which the movement of the whole Scheisse is resolved." (To Engels,
30.^.68. In Correspondence, P 2^5)* Yet, when Godelier quotes Marx's 
letter (11.7*68, only 2% months later) to Kugelmann - "I represent large- 
scale industry not only as the mother of the antagonism, but also as the
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creator of the material and spiritual conditions necessary for the solution 
of this antagonism", - he appears literally unable to hear the second half 
of Marx's sentence at all. It seems to be impossible, within the trans- 
formatory logic of the fully-blown structuralist enterprise, for a writer 
as sophisticated as Godelier to conceive of the material conditions and 
'unconscious' effects of a system requiring the self-conscious practice 
of a class to realize its inner contradictions. Yet, for Marx, clearly, 
it was exactly the interpenetration of the 'objective' contradictions of 
a productive mode with the 'subjective' politics of the class struggle 
which alone raised his own theory above the level of a 'Utopia' to the 
status of a science: just as it was the coincidence of an adequate theory 
with the formation of a class 'for itself' which alone guaranteed the 
'complex unity' of theory and practice. The idea that the unity of theory 
and practice could be constituted on the ground of theory alone would not 
have occurred to Marx, especially after the demolition of Hegel: even when - 
as in the middle of the most technical sections of Capital volume 2 - what 
seems most to be preoccupying him is "the beauty and greatness of it: this 
spontaneous interconnection, this material and mental metabolism which is 
independent of the knowing and willing of individual and which presupposes 
their reciprocal independence and indifference" (Grund P 161). (Korsch's 
attempt to relate this more 'scientific' phase - post 1848 -.of Marx's 
work to the different tempo of the European class struggle is of considerable 
interest. Cf: Part II of Karl Marx and Marxism and Philosophy, P 92ff.).
Marx knew that this "exchange of equivalents" was "only .the.surface layer": 
that "This system rests on capital as its foundation, and, when it is 
regarded in isolation from capital, as it appears on the surface, as an 
independent system, then it is a mere, illusion, but a necessary illusion". 
(Grund P 509) (his italics).
There remains only the extremely cryptic Notes (intro, P 109^111) at 
the end of the Intro: notes on notes - "to be mentioned here"., "not to 
be forgotten", nothing more. The points rapidly touched on in these pages *
*
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are, indeed, extremely interesting and theoretically of the highest importance. 
They index, in an extremely truncated manner, complex questions which lie 
at the outer perimeter of Marx's reflections on method. There is scarcely 
enough here for anything that we could call a 'clarification* of these traces* 
They are at best, traces: what they tell us is that - significantly enough - 
Marx already had these questions in mind. What they hardly reveal is what 
he thought about them. Characteristically, they primarily concern the 
superstructurol forms: "Forms of the State and Forms of Consciousness in 
Relation to Relations of Production and Circulation, Legal Relations,
Family Relations". What would the reader give for a section at least as 
long as that on "The Method of Political Economy" on these points. It was 
not to be.
We can, merely, note what the problems here seemed to him to be, 
since they constitute some significant part of the uncompleted project - 
and thus the work of theoretical completion - which Marx bequeathed.
They touch, centrally, on the question as to how, precisely, we are to 
understand and work with the key concepts: 'productive forces', 'Relations 
of production'. Moreover, they specify these at the more mediated levels: 
the relation of these primary, infrastructural concepts to war and the 
army; to cultural history and historiography; to international relations; 
to art, education and law. Two conceptual formulations of the first import­
ance are briefly enunciated. First, it is said again, with respect to the 
productive force/relation of production distinction, that (far from 
constituting two disconnected structures, between which an 'objective' 
contradiction arises) they must be conceived dialectically. It Is a 
dialectic which, as we know from Capital, is itself subject to the delayed 
historical movement: thus, with large-scale industry, even the practical 
application of science to material production can become a "productive 
force". The boundaries of this dialectical relation, however,, remain 
to be specified in any theoretical fullness (''to be determined"): it is 
a dialectic which connects, but which is not an 'immediate identity' - it
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does not "suspend the real difference" between the two terms. Second, the 
relation of artistic development, of education and of law to material 
production is specified as constituting a relation of "uneven development". 
Again, a theoretical note of immense importance.
The point about artistic development and material production is then 
briefly expanded. The "unevenness" of the development of art to production 
is instanced by the contrast between the flowering of artistic work at a 
point of early, indeed, "skeletal" social organization.* Thus’ a great art form 
e.g. the epic - appears as a developed category in a still simple stage 
of the ancient code of production. This is an instance which points back 
to the earlier example in the main text of the Intro, where 'money', as a 
relatively developed category makes its appearance within a still 
undeveloped set of productive relations. In short, though Marx is here 
opening up a problem of great complexity - the graphic demonstration of 
the 'law of the uneven relations of structure and superstructures' - he 
is less concerned with developing a Marxist aesthetics at this point, than 
he is with his previous concerns: his argument is that, like 'money' and 
'labour' and 'production' itself, art does not 'wade its way' in a simple, 
sequential march from early to late, simple to develope, keeping in step 
with its material base. We must look at it in its 'modal connexion and 
relatedness with other 'relations' at specific stages. Here, too, Marx 
suggests, the more concrete our investigation, the more "specified" the 
interconnections, the more quickly the operation of that 'abstract' law 
of "uneven development" can be clarified.
Hie concrete example - Greek art - is subordinated to the same 
theoretical preoccupation. Greek art presupposes a quite specific set of 
relations with other 'relations'. It requires the concrete organization 
of the productive forces of Ancient society - it is incompatible with spindles, 
railways, locomotives. It requires its own, specific modes of production - 
it is incompatible with electricity and the printing press. Moreover, it 
requires its own forms of consciousness: mythology. Not any mythology -
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Egyptian mythology belongs to a different complex, and would -not do. But, 
nor is mythology to be understood as a matter of religious consciousness 
or popular imagaination exclusively. For mythology survives only to the 
degree that the scientific mastery over Nature is not yet fully accomplished. 
The domination of the forces of Nature by imagination (mythology) lasts 
only so long as science and technique has not overtaken magic in its 
pacification of Nature. Thus, mythology is a form of consciousness which 
is only possible at a certain stage or level of development of the 
productive forces - and hence, since this mythology is the characteristic 
material and mode of imagination for the epic, the epic is connected - but 
by a complex and uneven chain of mediations - to the productive forces and 
relations of Greek society. Do not, then, certain developments in the 
productive forces and relations render certain art forms unthinkable?
Is the heroic form of Achilles imaginable in terms of modern warfare?
It is important, however, that Katrx does not end with this question 
of the historical compatibility between artistic and material forms. 
Difficult though it is to specify, concretely, the precise ways in which 
the development of artistic forms are bound up with social development, 
the greater theoretical difficulty is to conceive how such apparently 
ancient forms stand in relation to the "present historic organization of 
production". "The point", he had already said, "is not the historic 
position of the economic relations in the succession of different forms 
of society ... rather, their order within bourgeois society". Here, once 
again, Marx gives a concrete instance of the way he combines, in his method, 
the analysis of concrete instances, the epochal development of complex 
structures through time, and the 'law* of the mutual connection and inter­
dependence of relations within the present mode of production. The 
demonstration, then, though alarmingly brief and elliptical, is exemplary.
The answer to the question - in terms of the "charm" for us of "the historic 
childhood of humanity" - is, unfortunately, unsatisfactory in almost every
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respect. The resolution to these perplexing, (and, in our times, 
progressively central and determining) theoretical issues is achieved 
stylistically, but not conceptually.
- 65-
V
Let us in conclusion, consider what light, if any, the 1857 Intro 
throws on the problem of 'theoretical breaks' in Marx. Marx considered 
classical Political Economy to be the new science of the emergent 
bourgeoisie. In this classical form it attempted to formulate the laws 
of capitalist production. Marx had no illusions that Political Economy 
could, untransformed, be made theoretically an adequate science for the 
guidance of revolutionary action: though he did, again and again, make the 
sharpest distinction between the * classical' period which opened with Petty, 
Boisgilbert and Adam Smith and closed with Ricardo and Sismondi, and the 
'vulgarisers', with whom Marx dealt disnissively, but whom he read with 
surprising thoroughness and debated intensively to the end of his life.
Yet some of his sharpest criticism was reserved for the 'radical' Political 
Economists - the 'left-Ricardians', like Bray, the Owenites, Rodbertus, 
Lasalle and Proudhon - who thought Political Economy theoretically 
self-sufficient though skewed in its political application, and proposed 
those changes from above which would bring social relations in line with 
the requirements of the theory. The socialist Ricardians argued that, 
since labour was the source of value, all men should become labourers 
exchanging equivalent amounts of labour. Marx took a harder road. The 
exchange of equivalents, though 'real enough' at one level, was deeply 
'unreal' at another. This was just the frontier beyond which Political 
Economy would not or could not pass. However, merely by knowing this 
to be true did not, in Marx's sense, make it real for men in practice.
He would have agreed with Engels when he remarked that, in so far as 
bourgeois laws of production did still operate, 'the larger part of the 
product does not belong to.the workers who have produced it " but to 
capital. (Preface to Pov. of Phil). These laws;-could only be thrown 
over in practice: they could not be transformed by juggling the. 
categories. At this point, then, the critique of Political Economy, 
and of its radical revisionists, merged with the meta-critique of Hegel 
and the left-Hegelians: for Hegel, too, conceived " only of abstractions
which revolve in its own circle " and " mistook the movement of
the categories " for the profane movement of history; and his radical 
'disciples thought the Hegelian system complete, and only its application 
lacking its proper finishing touch. Korsch is persuasive when he suggests 
that, from a very early period in his life, it was this "natural scientist 
whom he had discovered beneath the mystifying disguise of the philosophical 
explorer of the human mind’! which really attracted Marx to Hegel, and that 
he abandoned the Hegelian route once "he felt able to represent in a 
direct and rational way those material connections between men and things 
and between men and men which formed the real contents hidden under an 
apparent speculative connection of ideas" (Karl Marx, P179-80). Certainly, 
when Marx said of Proudhon that he "conquers economic alienation only 
within the bounds of economic alienation” (Holy Family, P213), it was a 
direct echo, if not a deliberate parody, of the critique he had already 
made of Hegel.
It is this point - that bourgeois relations must be overthrown in 
practice before they can be wholly superceded in theory - which accounts 
for the complex, paradoxical, relations Marx's mature work bears to 
Political Economy: and thus for the extreme difficulty we have in trying 
to mark exactly where it is that Marxism, as a self-sufficient 'science', 
breaks wholly and finally with Political Economy. The form of the 
question is, of course, exactly that which has in r^ent years so preoccupied 
Marxist theoretical discussion vis-a-vis Hegel: and it may be that we must 
tentatively return the same kind of answer to each form of the question.
(Cf: the more extended treatment of the Marx/Hegel relation in my 
Settling Accounts V.'ith Althusser paper).
The whole of Marx's mature effort is, indeed, the critique of the 
.categories of Political Economy, The critique of method is positively 
opened, though not closed, in the famous 1857 Intro. Yet Political 
Economy remains Marx's only theoretical point-of departure. Even when 
it has been vanquished and transformed, as in the case of the dismantling 
of the Pdcardian theory of wages, or in the break-through with the suspended 
concept of surplus value, Marx never seems free of it: he keeps returning
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to it, refining his differences from it, examining it, criticising it, 
going beyond it, Thus even when Marx's theoretical formulations lay the 
foundations of a materialist science of historical formations, the 'laws' 
of Political Economy still command the field, theoretically - because they 
dominate social life in practice. Thus, to paraphrase Marx's remarks on 
the German "theoretical conscience", he reminds us that Political Econorny 
cannot be realized in practice without abolishing it in theory, just as, 
on the other side, it cannot be abolished in practice until it has been 
theoretically 'realised'. (Critique of Hegel's Phil, of Right, PU8-9)
'This is in no sense to deny his ' breakthroughs.%» The three cardinal 
points of his transformation of Fpl. Scon, which he identified to Engels  ^
in a letter - on surplus value, labour-power and the real relations behind the 
wages-form - constitute a small part only of the transformations of the 
Ricardian system which he accomplished. In a thousand other ways, Capital, 
in the doubleness of its unmasking and reformulations, its long suspensions 
(while Marx lays bare the circuits of capital 'as if they were really so', 
only to shov;, in a later section, what happens when we return this 'pure 
case' to its real connections), and its transitions, lays the foundation 
of a 'scientific' critique of the laws of capitalist production. Yet 
it remains a critique to the end: indeed, the critique appears (to return 
to the 1857 text) as the form of the scientificity of his method.
The nature of this 'end' must be spelled out. It was not an attempt 
to erect a scientifically self-sufficient theory to replace the inadequate 
structure of Pol. Econ; his work is not a theoreticist replacement of one 
knowledge by another. Formed as it was, principally, in the aftermath 
of the 18^8 upheavals,Marx's thought did, clearly, increasingly cast 
itself in the form of theoretical work, though:this was - contrary to 
some impressions -by no means all that he was doing in the period between 
1850 and his death. No doubt the complexity of the work imposed its own 
rhythms. Yet for all that, the theoretical labour of which the successive 
drafts and pre-drafts of Capitalvhero the result had, as its prospective
4
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'end* - paradoxically - something other than the 'founding of a science'.
That is why historical materialism, though 'scientific', is not a science 
like others which have contended with it for supremacy in this field. We 
cannot pretend, as yet, to have mastered in any way the extremely complex 
articulations which connect the scientific forms of historical materialism 
with the revolutionary practice of a class in practice. But I think we 
have been right to assume that, the power, the historical significance* 
and the grip of Marx's theories are related, in some way we do not yet 
fully understand, precisely to this double articulation of theory and 
practice. (One of the fascinations of the 1857 Intro is that it makes this 
question - admittedly, in a theoretical form - the self-conscious centre 
of the inquiry, in a way which is more -thoroughly disguised in the substantive 
analyses of Capital.) We are by now familiar with a kind of 'reading' 
of the more polemical texts - like the Manifesto - where the theory is 
glimpsed, so to speak, refracted through the politicalanalysis and rhetoric. 
But we are still easily confused when, in the later texts, the movement 
of the classes in struggle are glimpsed, so to speak, refracted through the 
theoretical constructs and arguments. It is a strong temptation to believe 
that, in the latter, only Science holds the field. At the same time, we 
must register our dissatisfaction with the manner in which this dialectical 
difficulty at the heart of Marx's enterprise has been resolved, as it 
were, 'from the other side'. If the 1857 Intro shows, conclusively, that 
Marx's method is not the method of positivist science, it also demonstrates 
that there is no simple theory of praxis to be won from his mature work 
either.
Marx's mature method, then, does not consist - we would argue - 
of an attempt to found a closed theoreticist replacement of bourgeois 
Political Economy. Not does it represent an idealist replacement of 
alienated bourgeois relations by 'truly human' ones. For great sections 
his work consists of the profoundly revolutionary, critical is.sk of 
showing exactly how the laws of political economy really worked. They 
worked, in part, through their very formalism: he patiently analyses and
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unpacks the 'phenomenal forms'. They worked by representing themselves, 
in theory and consciousness, in a mystified and inverted form, as something 
other than they really were. Thus, in everyday consciousness, wages appear 
as a proper and equivalent return to labour: for its part in production.
Only if labour is seen as a commodity which is also not a commodity, a 
power, a source not only of 'value' but of surplus-value, can it be shown 
that wages are, indeed, a mystified though necessary 'form' with another, 
deeper, contradictory relation hidden within it. Marx's critique, then, 
takes us to the level at which the real relations of capitalism can be 
penetrated and revealed. In formulating the nodal points of this critique 
Political Economy - the highest expression of these relations grasped as 
mental categories - provided the only possible starting point. Marx begins 
there. Capital then remains UA Critique of Political Economy1’: not 
'Communism: An alternative to Capitalism'. The notion of a 'break' - 
final, thorough, complete - by Marx with Political Economy is, ultimately, 
an idealist notion, even when the 'break' is marked in the name of dividing 
science from ideology: a notion which does not and cannot do justice to 
the real complexities of the relations between revolutionary practice and 
a theoretical labour - Capital and all that led up to it - which could 
both strip bourgeois relations to their foundations, but which could not 
replace the laws of those relations, as expressed in Pol.Econ., in theory 
because it has not yet replaced them in practice.
Much the same seems to be true of Marx's relation to Hegel, though 
here a substantive 'break' is easier to identify - and, for what it is worth, 
is identified time and again for us by Marx himself. It is the relation 
to Hegel in terms of method which continues to be troubling. Early 
and late, Marx and Engels marked the thorough-going manner in which 
the whole idealist framework of Hegel's thought had to be abandoned.
The dialectic in its idealist form, too, had to undergo a thorough 
transformation for its real scientific kernel to become available to 
historical materialism as a scientific starting-point. It has been argued 
that Marx and Engel cannot have meant it when they said that something
rational could be rescued from Hegel's idealist husk: yet, for men who spent 
their lives attempting to harness thought to history in language, they appear 
peculiarly addicted to that troubling metaphor of kernel and husk. Could 
something remain of Hegel's method - which a thorough going transformation 
would rescue - when his system had to be totally abandoned as mystification 
and idealist rubbish? But that is like asking whether, since Ricardo marked 
the closure of a bourgeois science (and was a rich banker to boot) there 
was anything which the founder of historical materialism could learn from 
him. Clearly, there was: clearly he did. He never ceased to learn from 
Ricardo, even when in the throes of dismantling him. He never ceased to 
take his bearings from classical Political Economy, even when he knew it 
could not finally think outside its bourgeois skin. In the same way, 
whenever he returns to the wholly unacceptable substance of the Hegelian 
system, he always pinpoints, in the same moment, what it is he learned from 
"that mighty thinker", what had to be turned "right-side-up" to be of 
service. This did not make the mature Marx 'a Hegelian' any more them 
Capital made Marx a Ricardian. To think this is to misunderstand profoundly 
the nature of the ^ critique as a form of knowledge, and the dialectical method 
Certainly, as far as the 1857 Introduction is concerned, time and again 
Hegel is decisively abandoned and overthrown, almost at the very points 
where I5arx is clearly learning - or re-learning - something from his 
dialectical method. One of the traces of light which this text captures 
for us is the illumination of this suprisingly late moment of supercession 
- of return-and-transformation.
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